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Abstract
In this dissertation, we propose the study of algorithms and protocols for key manage-
ment and anonymous secure routing in large ad hoc networks. Existing research efforts
in key management can only handle very limited number of nodes and are vulnera-
ble to active attacks. Therefore, one aim of this dissertation is to investigate scalable
key management protocols for large ad hoc networks by exploiting hierarchical network
structures, threshold digital signature schemes, and verifiable secret sharing techniques.
Previous research in anonymous secure routing merely provides weak location privacy
and route anonymity. The other aim of this dissertation is to design routing protocols
with strong anonymity properties without compromising the underlying security require-
ments. Furthermore, this dissertation systematically proposes and evaluates methods
that might be able to improve the efficiency of anonymous routing protocols in ad hoc
networks.
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Summary
In this dissertation, we propose the study of algorithms and protocols for key manage-
ment and anonymous secure routing in large ad hoc networks. In view of the fact that
existing research efforts in key management can only handle very limited number of
nodes and are vulnerable to active attacks, one aim of this dissertation is to investigate
scalable key management protocols for large ad hoc networks by exploiting hierarchical
network structures, threshold digital signature schemes, and verifiable secret sharing
techniques. Most previous work in anonymous secure routing only satisfies a part of the
requirements for anonymity, and are vulnerable to specific attacks. In addition, they
are inefficient due to the high communication and computation costs involved during
the route discovery/maintenance process. The other aim of this dissertation is to design
efficient routing protocols with strong anonymity properties without compromising the
underlying security requirements.
In this dissertation, we focus on two major research areas in ad hoc network security:
key management and secure routing. In the area of key management, we propose an
Autonomous Key Management (AKM) scheme for large ad hoc networks, and two al-
gorithms for certification services which are independent of AKM and that are resistant
to active attacks. Comprehensive simulation results show that AKM incurs low compu-
tation overhead in handling network dynamic events (such as join and leave) and our
second algorithm for certification services is much faster than those in [1–3]. In the area
xiii
of secure ad hoc routing, we first identify the requirements for anonymity and security.
We then propose a new anonymous routing protocol, named the Efficient Anonymity
and Security-Enabled (EASE) routing protocol. Detailed analysis shows that EASE
achieves both anonymity and security properties, as defined in our requirements. A
major challenge in designing anonymous routing protocols is to reduce the computa-
tion and communication costs. To overcome this challenge, EASE has been designed
to require neither asymmetric nor symmetric encryption/decryption while forwarding
flooding route requests. Moreover, it provides a local repair mechanism to fix broken
parts of a route without compromising security and anonymity. We analyze and mea-
sure the effectiveness of EASE in various network and mobility settings and show that,
compared with previous proposals, EASE is more efficient in highly dynamic networking
settings. This dissertation also systematically evaluates methods that might be able to
improve the efficiency of anonymous routing protocols in ad hoc networks.
In conclusion, extensive simulation results and analysis in this dissertation show that,
we provide a comprehensive solution for key management in ad hoc networks. At the
architecture level, AKM is proposed to enhance the scalability, flexibility and adaptivity
of key management. At the algorithm level, two algorithms are proposed to defend active
attacks against certification services. Besides that, we design an anonymous secure
routing protocol which offers enhanced features in the sense of anonymity, security, and




Since their emergence in the 1970s, wireless networks have become increasingly popular
in the computing arena. This is particularly true in the past decade, which has seen
wireless networks being adapted to enable mobility. There are currently two variations
of mobile wireless networks. The first is known as the infrastructure-based network
(i.e., a network with fixed and wired gateways), shown in Figure 1.1. The bridges for
these networks are known as base stations. Typical applications of this type of network
include office Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs).
Figure 1.1: Infrastructure-based network Figure 1.2: Ad hoc network
The second type of mobile wireless network is the infrastructureless mobile network,
commonly known as ad hoc networks (shown in Figure 1.2). Ad hoc networks are wireless
multi-hop packet networks without any fixed infrastructure. All nodes are capable of
movement and can be connected dynamically in an arbitrary manner. Nodes in these
networks function as routers which discover and maintain routes to other nodes in the
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network. Advantages of such systems are “rapid deployment, robustness, flexibility and
inherent support for mobility” [4].
1.1 Applications of Ad Hoc Networks
Some applications of ad hoc network technology include industrial and commercial ap-
plications involving cooperative mobile data exchange. Example applications are emer-
gency search-and-rescue operations [5], meetings or conventions in which persons wish
to quickly share information, or data acquisition in inhospitable terrains [6, 7]. There
are also existing and future military networking requirements for robust data services
within mobile wireless communication networks. Many of these networks consist of
highly dynamic autonomous topology segments. In addition, the developing technolo-
gies of “wearable” computing and communications [8] provide applications for ad hoc
networks as well. When properly combined with satellite-based information delivery [9],
ad hoc networks can provide an extremely flexible method for establishing communi-
cations for fire/safety/rescue operations or other scenarios requiring rapidly deployable
communications with survivable, efficient dynamic networking. The unique characteris-
tics of the satellite bring it several advantages over ground-based nodes. For example,
the high altitude of a satellite enable it to communicate with ground nodes within a very
large area. Moreover, with the spot beam technology, satellites can support localized
communications between disjoint sets of ground nodes.
In the future, ad hoc networks will likely form the outermost region of the inter-
network, where a wired backbone connects both the fixed local area networks and the
2
mobile (both the fixed infrastructure and the ad hoc) networks. Whereas the base
stations of a fixed infrastructure networks are directly connected to the core, ad hoc
networks are typically connected through a satellite link or a terrestrial switch (fixed
wired connection point, or mobile radio link). This vision, however, requires still some
further developments in ad hoc networking.
1.2 Characteristics of Ad Hoc Networks
Compared to conventional networks, ad hoc networks have several salient characteristics:
No central management Ad hoc networks are autonomously formed with a large
number of heterogeneous nodes (ranging in complexity from sensors to palmtops and
fully functional laptops and routers) without the aid of any pre-existing communica-
tion infrastructure. Therefore, tasks are distributed over and carried out by groups of
collaborating nodes. This lack of infrastructure introduces problems in routing, name
resolution, service discovery and security [10,11]. The trust in the prior context of secu-
rity can be transferred and transformed when providing security services. There is also
absence of an online server that has its influence on security.
Dynamic topology and membership Nodes are free to move arbitrarily. Thus,
the network topology, which is typically multi-hop, may change randomly and rapidly
at unpredictable times, and may consist of both bidirectional and unidirectional links.
In addition, nodes may join or leave a group or a region with freedom.
Bandwidth-constrained variable capacity links Wireless links will continue to
have significantly lower capacity than their hardwired counterparts. In addition, the
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realized throughput of wireless communications, after accounting for the effects of mul-
tiple access, fading, noise, and interference conditions, etc., is often much less than a
radio’s maximum transmission rate. One effect of the relatively low to moderate link ca-
pacities is that congestion is typically the norm rather than the exception, i.e. aggregate
application demand will likely approach or exceed network capacity frequently. As the
ad hoc network is often simply an extension of the fixed network infrastructure, mobile
ad hoc users will demand similar services. These demands will continue to increase as
multimedia computing and collaborative networking applications rise.
Energy-constrained operation Some or all of the nodes in an ad hoc network may
rely on batteries or other exhaustible means for their energy. For these nodes, the most
important system design criteria for optimization may be energy conservation.
Limited physical security Ad hoc networks are generally more prone to physical
security threats than are fixed-cable networks. The increased possibility of eavesdrop-
ping, spoofing, and Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks should be carefully considered.
Existing link security techniques are often applied within wireless networks to reduce
security threats. As a benefit, the decentralized nature of network control in ad hoc
networks provides additional robustness against the single point of failure problem of
more centralized approaches.
These characteristics create a set of underlying assumptions and performance con-
cerns for protocol design, which extend beyond those guiding the design of routing,
security, and many other aspects of a network within the higher-speed, relatively static
topology of the fixed Internet.
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1.3 Security Threats in Ad Hoc Networks
Compared to the wired networks, ad hoc network is much more vulnerable to security at-
tacks. This is mainly due to its features of open medium, dynamic topology, cooperative
algorithms, lack of centralized monitoring and management point.
1.3.1 Types of Attacks
Attacks against ad hoc networks can be divided into two groups: passive attacks and ac-
tive attacks. Passive attacks involve only eavesdropping of data. Active attacks involve
actions performed by adversaries, for instance the replay, fabrication, modification and
deletion of exchanged data. External attacks are typically active attacks that are tar-
geted e.g. to cause congestion, propagate incorrect routing information, prevent services
from working properly or shut down them completely. External attacks can typically
be prevented by using standard security mechanisms, such as firewalls, encryption, and
so on. Internal attacks are typically more severe attacks, since malicious insider nodes
already belong to the network as an authorized party and are thus protected with the
security mechanisms the network and its services offer. Thus, such malicious insiders
who may even operate in a group may use the standard security means to actually
protect their attacks. These kind of malicious parties are called compromised nodes, as
their actions compromise the security of the whole ad hoc network.
1.3.2 Denial of Service
The denial of service threat either produced by an unintentional failure or a malicious
action forms a severe security risk in any distributed system. The denial of service attack
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has many forms. The classical way is to flood any centralized resource so that it no longer
operates correctly or crashes, but in ad hoc networks this may not be applicable due to
the distribution of responsibility. Distributed denial of service attack is a more severe
threat. If the attackers have enough computing power and bandwidth to operate with,
smaller ad hoc networks can be crashed or congested rather easily. There are, however,
more serious threats to ad hoc networks. For example, compromised nodes may be able
to reconfigure the routing protocol or any part of it so that they send routing information
very frequently, thus causing congestion or very rarely, thus preventing nodes to gain
new information about the changed topology of the network. In the worst case, the
adversary is able to change routing protocol to operate arbitrarily or perhaps even in
the (invalid) way the attacker wants. If the compromised nodes and the changes to the
routing protocol are not detected, the consequences are severe, as from the viewpoint of
the nodes the network may seem to operate normally.
1.3.3 Impersonation
Impersonation attacks form a serious security risk at all levels of ad hoc networking. If
proper authentication of parties is not supported, compromised nodes in the network
layer may be able to join the network undetected or send false routing information mas-
querading as some other trusted node. Within network management, the attacker could
gain access to the configuration system as a super user. At the service level, a malicious
party could have its public key certified even without proper credentials. Thus, imper-
sonation attacks are related to all critical operations in ad hoc networks. Impersonation
threats are mitigated by applying strong authentication mechanisms in contexts where
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a party has to be able to trust the origin of data it has received or stored. Most of-
ten this means in every layer the application of digital signature or keyed fingerprints
over routing messages, configuration or status information or exchanged payload data
of the services in use. Digital signatures implemented with public-key cryptography are
as such a problematic issue within ad hoc networks, as they require an efficient and
secure key management service and relatively large computation power. Thus, in many
cases, more efficient solutions like the use of keyed hash functions or a priori negotiated
and certified keys and session identifiers are needed. They do not, however, remove the
demand for secure key management or proper confidentiality protection mechanisms.
1.3.4 Disclosure
Any communication must be protected from eavesdropping, whenever confidential in-
formation is exchanged. Also critical data that the nodes store must be protected from
unauthorized access. In ad hoc networks, such information can include almost anything,
e.g. specific status details of a node, location of nodes, private or secret keys, passwords,
and so on. Sometimes, control data is more critical information in respect of the security
than the actual exchanged data. For instance, the routing directives in packet headers,
such as the identity or location of the nodes, can sometimes be more valuable than the
application-level messages. This applies especially in critical military applications.
1.3.5 Wormhole Attack
The wormhole attack [12] is a severe threat against ad hoc routing protocols that is
particularly challenging to detect and prevent. In a wormhole attack, a malicious node
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can record packets (or bits) at one location in the network and tunnel them to another
location through a private network shared with a colluding malicious node. Most exist-
ing ad hoc routing protocols, without some mechanism to defend against the wormhole
attack would be unable to find consistent routes to any destination which can severely
disrupting communication. A dangerous attack can be launched silently and success-
fully, if a wormhole attacker tunnels all packets through the wormhole honestly and
reliably since no harm seems to be done: the attacker actually seems to provide a useful
service in connecting the network more efficiently. However, when an attacker forwards
only routing control messages and not data packets, communication may be severely
damaged. As an example, when used against an on-demand routing protocol such as
Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) [13,14], a powerful application of the wormhole attack
can be mounted by tunnelling each RREQ message directly to the destination target
node of the request. Under some extreme condition, i.e. two colluding attackers are one
hop from the sender and the receiver respectively, this attack prevents routes more than
two hops long from being discovered because RREP messages would arrive to the source
faster than any other replies or, worse, RREQ messages arriving from other nodes next
to the destination than the attacker would be discarded since they would have already
been seen. In [12], Hu et al. propose a general mechanism, called packet leashes, for
detecting and thus defending against wormhole attacks.
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1.4 Criteria for Securing Ad Hoc Networks
To secure an ad hoc network, we consider the following criteria: authentication, avail-
ability, confidentiality, integrity, and non-repudiation.
1.4.1 Authentication
From a security point of view, the ad-hoc network has a fundamental problem: there
are no online servers [10, 11]. Instead, usually a centralized administrator takes care
of authorization mechanism. However, the interaction with the administrator can be
expensive and time-consuming. The mechanism can be implemented by access control
lists or capabilities like signed certificates. The length of valid period of access control
lists and capabilities has influence on convenience. Some trade-off between them has to
be made.
1.4.2 Availability
Availability means that the service is offered to the user when it is requested. It is
a central issue in ad hoc networks that must operate in dynamic and unpredictable
conditions. The network nodes may be idle or even be shut down once for a while. Thus,
the ad hoc network cannot make any assumptions about availability of specific nodes at
any given time. For commercial applications using ad hoc networks, availability is often
the most important issue from the viewpoint of the clients. The routing protocol must
guarantee the robustness of the routing fabric so that the connectivity of the network
is maintained even when threatened by rapid changes in topology or attackers. Finally,
many ad hoc networking protocols are applied in conditions where the topology must
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scale up and down efficiently, e.g. due to network partitions or merges. The scalability
requirements also directly affect various security services, such as key management.
1.4.3 Confidentiality
Confidentiality ensures that certain information is never disclosed to unauthorized enti-
ties. Network transmission of sensitive information, such as strategic or tactical military
information, requires confidentiality. Leakage of such information to adversaries could
have devastating consequences. Routing information must also remain confidential in
certain cases, because the information might be valuable for enemies to identify and to
locate their targets in a battlefield.
1.4.4 Integrity
Integrity is close to authenticity, but it means that no node has been maliciously changed
[10]. In case of integrity, there are similarities between that of ad-hoc network and that
of more conventional systems. Integrity has to be preserved. As certificate and identities
are not secret, it is possible to clone a device. By securing the public key and letting
only the device to know his private key, it is possible to use the certificate in a sensible
way. The device has to be tamper-proof, so that his private key cannot be read out and
used in a fake device. The best way to avoid attacks is to try to make the node tamper-
proof, which is not simple at all. In [15], Anderson and Kuhn state the importance
and necessity of design security systems more carefully. The systems have to be tested
also against hostile attackers. The physical tamper-evidence mechanisms are often more
suitable. The tampering itself can be more than changing a code or key. It can also be
10
a direct attack to a device.
1.4.5 Non-repudiation
Non-repudiation ensures that the origin of a message cannot deny having sent the mes-
sage. It is useful for detection and isolation of compromised nodes. When node A
receives an erroneous message from node B, non-repudiation allows A to accuse B using
this message and to convince other nodes that B is compromised.
1.5 Motivations and Problem Definition of Our Work
The research areas in security for ad hoc networks include key management, secure rout-
ing, intrusion detection, availability, fairness, secure sensor networks, and lightweight
cryptographic protocols. In this dissertation, we concentrate on two major research
fields: key management, and secure routing, more specifically, anonymous secure rout-
ing.
1.5.1 Key Management
Among all the security issues in ad hoc networks, key management is the most crucial,
because key management is the essential assumption of many other security services.
For instance, many secure routing protocols, such as ARAN [16] and SRP [17], assume
that a pair of private and public keys and a certificate signed by a Trusted Third Party
(TTP) have been assigned to nodes. The following are key management issues that
have been addressed in our work.
Scalability Current research work in key management [1–3, 18–21] can only handle
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limited number of nodes. When the number of nodes increases, most of them become
either inefficient or insecure.
Flexibility and Adaptivity Since there is no clear line of defense in ad hoc networks,
we cannot classify nodes in advance according to the risks they face. Even worse, in
some cases, for example soldiers in the battle field, not only do different parts of the
network face different degrees of risk, but also such risks may change rapidly because of
the dynamic property of ad hoc networks. Therefore, flexibility and adaptivity are two
crucial properties that should be considered when we design a key management scheme
for ad hoc networks.
Efficiency A major difference between ad hoc networks and wired network is that, in
the former, nodes normally have a very limited power supply and computation capability
(e.g. CPU and memory). As a result, any protocol that requires high computation
cannot be of practical use.
Security and Robustness There are two types of possible attacks on certification
services in ad hoc networks: passive attacks and active attacks. In passive attacks,
adversaries drop other nodes’ requests of assigning or renewing certificates silently. In
active attacks, in contrast, adversaries may return a fake reply (e.g. an invalid partial
certificate) to the node requesting certification service. Most current approaches for
certification services [1–3, 19, 20] mainly focus on passive attacks, and are inefficient in
cases where a malicious node launches active attacks. Unfortunately, active attacks are
feasible, especially in the military field. Because of the poor physical security in ad hoc
networks, adversaries may take over some nodes in the network. By launching active
attacks, adversaries can disable the certification services of the whole network without
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being caught, with only a very small portion of nodes.
1.5.2 Anonymous Secure Routing
Current research on secure routing in ad hoc networks mainly focuses on confidentiality,
integrity, authentication, availability, and fairness, and only recently have researchers
begun to pay attention to anonymity [22–25]. Anonymity should be an important part
of the overall solution for truly secure ad hoc networks, especially in certain privacy-vital
environments. In our dissertation, we address the following issues when designing a new
routing protocol for certain privacy-vital environments, e.g. in a battle field.
Privacy We want to protect the privacy of nodes involved in the routing protocol. The
privacy information includes the identity and location of the parties in communication,
as well as the route information and motion pattern of the source or the destination.
Accordingly, we divide the requirements on privacy into three parts: identity anonymity,
location privacy, and route anonymity, which are explained in detail in Section 4.1.
Security and Robustness We want to ensure that adversaries cannot obtain the
contents of communication (i.e., confidentiality), or disable the communication (i.e.,
availability and integrity).
Efficiency Current research efforts in anonymous routing are based on flooding route
requests, and thus the route discovery is a very costly process. Besides that, crypto-
graphic operations are employed on a hop-by-hop basis. Therefore, any new anonymous
routing protocol is expected to be both communicationally and computationally efficient.
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1.5.3 Thesis Statement
As a summary, we write the thesis statement of our dissertation as follows:
For key management in ad hoc networks, we propose a novel hierarchical scheme
based on threshold cryptography that provides the scalability, flexibility, and adaptiv-
ity; in addition, Verifiable Secret Sharing (VSS) [26, 27], including both the standard
schemes and their variants, is employed to defend active attacks against certification
services. To overcome the challenges in anonymous secure routing, a new routing pro-
tocol is designed to efficiently protect the privacy and security of the nodes involved
and the route found in the route discovery process. Our improvements are mainly
based on the following ideas: (1) minimize the usages of identity information to protect
the anonymity; (2) minimize the usages of cryptographic operations to improve the effi-
ciency and lower the effects of DoS attacks; (3) ensure that the lengths of the meaningful
contents of routing packets are invariant to thwart traffic analysis.
1.6 Outline of Dissertation
The dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we introduce the background
information in cryptography used in our work, and present a comprehensive review of
the research work in two major research fields of ad hoc network security: key manage-
ment and secure routing. In Chapter 3, we propose the Autonomous Key Management
(AKM) scheme for large ad hoc networks and two algorithms for certification services,
which can be used independent of AKM. Afterwards, in Chapter 4, we first rigorously
define requirements for anonymity and security properties of ad hoc networks, and then
14
propose the Efficient Anonymity and Security-Enabled (EASE) protocol that can pro-
vide additional properties for anonymity, and at the same time ensure the security of





In this chapter, we first introduce the background information in cryptography, including
the Shamir secret sharing scheme, proactive security, and verifiable secret sharing. They
are fundamental tools in our solutions for key management. Afterwards, related work
in key management in ad hoc networks are presented. Following that, we review the
anonymity-related research aiming at the Internet, before presenting research work on
secure routing in ad hoc networks.
2.1 Background in Cryptography
Efficient threshold schemes can be very helpful in the management of cryptographic keys.
In order to protect data, we can encrypt it, but in order to protect the encryption key,
we need a different method (further encryptions change the problem rather than solve
it). The most secure key management scheme keeps the key in a single, well-guarded
location (a computer, a human brain, or a safe). This scheme is highly unreliable
since a single misfortune (a computer breakdown, sudden death, or sabotage) can make
the information inaccessible. An obvious solution is to store multiple copies of the
key at different locations, but this increases the danger of security breaches (computer
penetration betrayal, or human errors). To solve this problem, threshold signature was
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proposed [28,29].
2.1.1 Shamir Polynomial Scheme
The first secret sharing scheme was proposed by Shamir in 1979 [30]. This scheme is
also called a (n, k)-threshold scheme, since it has the following properties: (1) any k or
more users can reconstruct the secret from their shares; (2) for k− 1 or fewer users it is
impossible to reconstruct the secret. The integer k is called the threshold. The details
of the scheme are shown as follows.
Let p > n be a large prime, let c1, · · · , cn ∈ Zp be the user identifiers, let k be the
threshold, and let S ∈ Zp be the secret. A trusted authority chooses random elements
a1, · · · , ak−1 ∈ Zp and sets up the polynomial
f(x) = ak−1x
k−1 + · · ·+ a1x+ S ∈ Zp[x]
of degree of k − 1, for a k-threshold scheme. The shares are obtained by
Si = f(ci) (mod p) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
and then distributed to the users.
The Shamir threshold scheme has several other nice properties. For instance, it is
easy to add new users without changing the shares of the existing users. The trusted
authority just chooses a nonzero identifier cn+1 ∈ Zp that has not been used before and
assigns the share Sn+1 = f(cn+1) (mod p). This does not affect the existing shares.
Similarly, we can implement various levels of control. If a user is higher up in the
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hierarchy, he/she can be provided with multiple shares corresponding to several different
user identifiers. This gives more weight to this person in privileged coalitions or in
blocking decisions. On the other hand, the Shamir threshold scheme can be used only
once. As soon as the members of a privileged coalition have disclosed their shares to
recover the secret, these shares are compromised.
2.1.2 Proactive Security
Distribution of the key based on secret sharing makes it harder for an adversary to expose
the secret key, but does not remove this risk. Common mode failures, for example those
flaws that exist in the implementation of the protocol or the operating system being
run on all servers, imply that “breaking into several machines may not be much harder
than breaking into one” [31]. Therefore, it is realistic to assume that even a distributed
secret key can be exposed. Proactive schemes, e.g. schemes proposed by Feldman [26],
Frankel and Desmedt [32], Jarecki [33], Herzberg et al. [34,35], and Frankel et al. [36,37],
address this to some extent and make the adversary’s task even harder, requiring all
of the break-ins to occur within a limited time frame. These schemes are summarized
below.
A proactive threshold cryptography scheme uses share refreshing, which enables users
to compute new shares from old ones in collaboration without disclosing the service
private key, i.e. the shared secret, to any user. The new shares constitute a new (n, k)
sharing of the service private key. After refreshing, users remove the old shares and use
the new ones to generate partial signatures. Because the new shares are independent
of the old ones, the adversary cannot combine old shares with new shares to recover
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the private key of the service. Thus, the adversary is challenged to compromise k users
between periodic refreshing.
Share refreshing relies on the following homomorphic property. If (s11, s12, · · · , s1n)
is an (n, k) sharing of k1 and (s21, s22, · · · , s2n) is an (n, k) sharing of k2, then
(s11 + s21, s12 + s22, · · · , s1n + s2n) is an (n, k) sharing of k1 + k2. If k2 is 0, then we
get a new (n, k) sharing of k1.
Given n users, let (s1, s2, · · · , sn) be an (n, k) sharing of the private key of the
service, with user i having si. Assuming all users are correct, share refreshing proceeds
as follows: first, each user randomly generates (si1, si2, · · · , sin), an (n, k) sharing of 0.
We call these newly generated sij’s subshares. Then, every subshare sij is distributed
to user j through a secure link. When user j gets the subshares s1j , s2j , · · · , snj , it
can compute a new share from these subshares and its old share (s′j = sj +
∑n
i=1 sij).









Figure 2.1: Share refreshing process based on homomorphic property
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2.1.3 Verifiable Secret Sharing Schemes
There are two weaknesses in the Shamir secret sharing scheme.
Honesty of the dealer If the dealer distributes erroneous subshares to some or all
the users, how can users verify whether the subshares received are correct?
Honesty of users During the share recovery process, if some compromised users
provide false subshares, how can other users detect them?
Share refreshing must tolerate missing subshares and erroneous subshares from com-
promised users. A compromised user may not send any subshares. However, as long as
correct users agree on the set of subshares to use, they can generate new shares using
only subshares generated from k users in an (n, k) secret sharing scheme.
To detect incorrect subshares, several VSS schemes [26,27,38–44] were proposed. A
verifiable secret sharing scheme generates extra public information for each (sub)share
using a one-way function. The public information can testify the correctness of the
corresponding (sub)shares without disclosing the (sub)shares.
Verifiable secret sharing schemes can be divided into two categories: non-interactive
and interactive. Non-interactive VSS schemes by Feldman [26] and Pedersen [27] assume
that the dealer broadcasts a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof to the shareholders,
and only the dealer may be faulty. Interactive VSS schemes assume that either the dealer
or some of the shareholders may be faulty, and include multiple rounds of communication
between the dealer and the shareholders to identify faulty participants; representative
examples include schemes by Chor et al. [38], Benaloh [39], Gennaro and Micali [40,41],
Goldreich et al. [42], and Rabin and Ben-Or [43,44]. The scheme of Gennaro and Micali
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[40, 41], and that of Rabin and Ben-Or [43,44], are information-theoretically secure.
In this section, we present the scheme proposed by Pedersen [27] to show the pro-
cedure for achieving verifiable secret sharing. Firstly, we introduce the commitment
scheme used in the Pedersen’s VSS scheme [27]. Let g and h be elements of Gq, such
that nobody knows loggh. These elements can either be chosen by a trusted center,
when the system is initialized, or by (some of) the participants using a coin-flipping
protocol. The committer commits himself to an s ∈ Zq by choosing t ∈ Zq, at random
and computing
E(s, t) = gsht (2.1)
Such a commitment can later be opened by revealing s and t. It is proved in [27]
that E(s, t) reveals no information about s, and that the committer cannot open a
commitment to s as s′ 6= s unless he can find logg(h).
Assume that a dealer, D, has a secret s ∈ Zq and wants to distribute it among n
parties, P1, . . . , Pn, such that any k of the shareholders can find s if necessary, but less
than k shareholders get no (Shannon) information about s (a (k, n)-threshold scheme).
Pedersen extend the Shamir scheme with a Verification Protocol (VP) that satisfies the
following two requirements:
1. If the dealer follows the distribution protocol and if the dealer and Pi both follow
VP, then Pi accepts with probability 1.
2. For all subset S1 and S2 of 1, . . . , n of size k such that all parties (Pi)i∈S1 and
(Pi)i∈S2 , have accepted their shares in VP the following holds except with negli-
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gible probability in |q|: If si is the secret computed by the participants in Si (for
i = 1, 2) then s1 = s2.
A share is called correct, if it is accepted in VP. These two requirements guarantees that
the dealer will be almost always (with negligible probability in |q|) caught when trying
to cheat, i.e. distributing inconsistent shares.
Detailed steps of the VSS scheme proposed in [27] are presented as follows. By the
fact that Zq is a field, the dealer can distribute s ∈ Zq as follows.
1. D publishes a commitment to s: E0 = E(s, t) for a randomly chosen t ∈ Zq.
2. D chooses F ∈ Zq[x] of degree at most k − 1 satisfying F (0) = s, and computes
si = F (i) for i = 1, . . . , n. Let F (x) = s + F1x + . . . + Fk−1x
k−1. D chooses
G1, . . . , Gk−1 ∈ Zq at random and useGi when committing to Fi for i = 1, . . . , k−
1 D broadcasts Ei = E(Fi, Gi) for i = 1, . . . , k − 1.
3. Let G(x) = t+ G1x + . . . + Gk−1x
k−1 and let ti = G(i) for i = 1, . . . , n. Then
D sends (si, ti) secretly to Pi for i = 1, . . . , n.







Let S ⊂ 1, . . . , n be a set of k participants such that Equation 2.2 holds for these














2.2 Key Management in Ad Hoc Networks
In general, security goals in ad hoc networks are achieved through cryptographic mech-
anisms such as public key encryption and digital signature. For example, the basic
assumption adopted by some secure routing protocols such as SRP [17] is the existence
of an a priori security association between all the communicating nodes of the network.
The limitations introduced by this approach range from the need of a managed environ-
ment, such as a common authority that pre-charges all the ad hoc nodes with a secret
key shared by every pair of communicating nodes, to scalability problems.
Other secure routing protocols, for example Ariadne [45], rely on an initialization
phase during which a well known TTP issues public key certificates used to authenticate
(together with the private key of each certificate holder) hash chain elements that will
be subsequently used to provide a low cost (in terms of CPU usage) authentication
service. In this case, the use of such a secure protocol is not limited to the managed
environment, and the open environment can be targeted. In other words, the authority
that manages the mobile nodes in the ad hoc network may not be the one that provides
the initial authentication setup. However, the bootstrap phase requires an external
infrastructure, which has to also be available during the lifetime of the ad hoc network
to provide revocation services. To solve this problem, several schemes [1–3,18–21,46–50]
have been proposed to distribute certificate-based public-key in a secure way. We classify
them into three categories: partially distributed key management, fully distributed key
management, and self-organizing public key management. In partially distributed key
management, the privilege of assigning a certificate is shared within a group of trusted
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servers, while in fully distributed key management, it is shared within all the users in
the network. As to self-organizing public key management, every user in the network
acts as a Certificate Authority (CA) and issues public-key certificates to other users.
2.2.1 Partially Distributed Key Management
In [18], Zhou and Haas focus on the establishment of a secure key management service
in an ad hoc networking environment. They propose the use of threshold cryptography
[29,51] to distribute trust, i.e. the functionality of generating a certificate, among a set
of servers. An (n, t+1) threshold cryptography scheme is employed. The private key k
of the service is divided into n shares (s1, s2, · · · , sn), each of which is assigned to one
server. Each server i also has a public/private key pair Ki/ki and knows the public keys
of all nodes. Figure 2.2 illustrates how the service is configured.
k
S1 S2 Sn
K1 / k1 K2 / k2 Kn / kn
Server 1 Server 2 Server n
Figure 2.2: Secret sharing of the private key k
For the service to sign a certificate, each server generates a partial signature for the
certificate using its private key share and submits the partial signature to a combiner.
With t + 1 correct partial signatures, the combiner is able to compute the signature
for the certificate. However, compromised servers (there are at most t of them) cannot
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generate correctly signed certificates by themselves, because they can generate at most
t partial signatures.
Figure 2.3 shows how servers generate a signature using a (3, 2) threshold signature
scheme. Given a service consisting of 3 servers. Let K/k be the public/private key
pair of the service. Using a (3, 2) threshold cryptography scheme, each server i gets a
share si of the private key k. For a message m, server i can generate a partial signature
PS(m, si) using its share si. Correct servers 1 and 3 both generate partial signatures
and forward the signatures to a combiner c. Even though server 2 fails to submit a












Figure 2.3: A (3, 2) threshold signature scheme
The focus of their work is to maximize the security of the shared secret in the
presence of possible compromises of the secret share holders. It assumes a small group
of servers with rich connectivity. However, the key establishment issue of normal nodes
is not addressed. Furthermore, the authors propose to use proactive schemes [33–37] of
share refreshing and to adapt to changes in the network in a scalable way.
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In [46], Yi and Kravets propose a scheme namedMobile Certificate Authority (MOCA).
Similar to [18], this scheme limits the candidates who hold a share of the secret key to a
subset of users denoted as MOCA. However, it leads to difficulties, such as judging the
level of security, choosing MOCAs, and ensuring that MOCAs are distributed uniformly,
etc. Besides that, they assume the existence of some nodes that are more trustworthy,
computationally more powerful, and physically more secure. Therefore, the scheme is
inappropriate for purely ad hoc networks. They also propose a new pattern of com-
munication, termed as “Manycast” [46], between a client and MOCAs. The pattern is
based on the assumption that the client knows the location and identities of the MOCA
nodes, and thus is not suitable for purely ad hoc networks. Furthermore, the authors
ignore potential passive and active attacks from malicious users, which may weaken the
benefit of employing MOCAs to save the packet overhead.
2.2.2 Fully Distributed Key Management
Based on the process of generating shared key, fully distributed key management can
be divided into two types: shared key generation based on RSA [52] and shared key
generation based on Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) [53]. Besides that, researchers
also try to make use of ID-based cryptography [54–56], which can be combined with
these two types of fully distributed solutions, in key management.
2.2.2.1 Shared Key Generation Based on RSA
In [1–3], Kong et al. also use threshold secret sharing to distribute the functions of the
CA but extend it to normal nodes. In the proposed scheme, any two communicating
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nodes can establish a temporary trust relationship via globally verifiable certificates.
With a scalable threshold sharing of the certificate-signing key, certification services
(issuing, renewal and revocation) are distributed among every node in the network. A
single node holds just a share of the complete certificate-signing key. While no single
node has the power of providing full certification services, multiple nodes in a network
locality can collaboratively provide such services. It minimizes the effort and complexity
for mobile clients to locate and contact the service providers.
The authors propose a localized trust model to characterize the localized nature
of security concerns in large ad hoc wireless networks. When applying such a trust
model, an entity is trusted if any k trusted entities claim so: these k trusted entities
are typically the neighboring nodes of the entity. A locally trusted entity is globally
accepted and a locally distrusted entity is regarded untrustworthy anywhere. k is a
system wide parameter that sets the global acceptance criteria and should be honored
by each entity in the system.
The basic assumptions necessary for their scheme to function properly are that: (1)
each node has a unique nonzero identifier; (2) each node has some one-hop discovery
mechanism; (3) each node has at least k one-hop legitimate neighboring nodes, or the
network has a minimum density of well-behaving nodes; (4) each node is equipped with
some detection mechanism to identify misbehaving nodes among its one-hop neighbor-
hood; (5) the mobility is characterized by a maximum node moving speed.
The two main issues presented in [1–3] are certification services and system mainte-
nance (i.e. the initialization and updates of secret shares).
Certification services include certificate renewal, certificate revocation and Certificate
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Revocation List (CRL) maintenance.
There are two different methods provided to assign a new certificate or to renew
certificates. For example, node i sends a request for a new certificate. As shown in
Figure 2.4, in the first method, node i selects k nearby nodes which form a group B in
advance, and sends its request within group B. Each node receiving the request will
generate a partial certificate and returns it to node i. Finally, node i combines all the k
partial certificates to generate the new certificate. The second method is similar to the
first one, except that the member of group B is not decided at the beginning. Instead,
node i first broadcasts its request, and then selects any k replies from all the replies
which form group B. The process of the second method is shown in Figure 2.5.
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Figure 2.4: The first method of certificate renewal
As to certificate revocation, it is based on the accusations from other nodes. If node
i receives more than k accusations on node j, it adds node j to its CRL database.
In [1–3], a dealer is required to initialize the first k nodes. After that, it destroys all
the secrets and quits. These k nodes then cooperate to distribute new shares to nearby
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Figure 2.5: The second method of certificate renewal
neighboring nodes, thus generating a diffusion process.
The process of self-initialization and share updates, in fact, is similar to the first
method of certification renewal, but this time each serving node returns a partial share
instead of a partial certificate. To prevent the secret shares held by each serving node
from leaking to other nodes including the requesting node, a complete shuﬄing scheme
is executed. The process is shown in Figure 2.6.
One of the two major weaknesses of this scheme is that it is difficult to set an
appropriate threshold k, which is a globally fixed parameter that is honored by each
entity in the system. This scheme assumes that each node has at least k one-hop
legitimate neighboring nodes and the deal needs to initialize k nodes at the beginning.
If k is set to a large number, many nodes may have problems in localizing certification
service and the initialization of secret shares. On the other hand, if k is too small, the
probability of global private key being compromised is quite high. It is also inefficient
to change the threshold according to the size of the system, since in the proactive
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1. Initialization request
2. Unicast shuffling packet
3. Routing shuffling packet
4. Unicast partial secret share
Figure 2.6: The process of self-initialization of secret shares
secret sharing scheme the computational complexity of changing the configuration of
the threshold scheme is very high. Another serious problem is that, due to the inability
of distinguishing adversaries who provide invalid partial certificates from honest nodes,
both of their algorithms for certificate renewal are vulnerable to active attacks, such
as send invalid partial certificates which result in the failure of renewing or assigning a
certificate. In addition, such algorithm is infeasible for a large ad hoc network, because
the time needed to initialize all the nodes could be so long that it results in asynchronism
in the secret scheme. In particular, the first k initializing nodes may have to refresh
their secret shares before all the nodes in the network have obtained their secret shares.
In [19], Lehane et al. present a similar scheme based on shared RSA key generation,
and thus share the pros and cons of the scheme proposed by Kong et al. [1–3]. In
addition, according to their empirical results, the efficiency of their protocol is not
good.
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2.2.2.2 Shared Key Generation Based on Discrete Logarithm Problem
One recent work by Narasimha et al. [47, 48] point out that the algorithm proposed
by Kong et al. [1–3] is vulnerable to active attacks, and propose a Threshold DSA
signature scheme. Their scheme is a standard VSS process based on DLP, and thus is
very costly. In addition, the standard VSS process requires almost twice as many as
neighbors involved in the certification service within one round. More specifically, given
that, there are k − 1 adversaries in the network, the Threshold DSA signature scheme
[47,48] requires helps from 2k − 1 neighbors.
2.2.2.3 ID-based Key Management
In [20], Khalili et al. try to combine the ideas of ID-based [54–56] and threshold cryp-
tography [29, 51]. Their scheme avoids the need for users to generate their own public
keys and distribute these keys throughout the network, since the user’s identity acts as
her public key. Besides that, users only need to propagate their identities instead of the
certificates. This can lead to huge savings in bandwidth. One major weakness of this
scheme is that it is vulnerable to active attacks. More specifically, malicious members of
the network can provide newly-joining members with a false master public key, perhaps
one for which the malicious member holds the corresponding master secret key.
2.2.3 Self-organizing Public Key Management for Mobile Ad Hoc Net-
works
In [21, 49, 50], Cˇapkun et al. propose a public-key management system for fully self-
organizing mobile ad hoc networks in which there is no infrastructure, no central au-
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thority, no centralized trusted third party, no central server, no secret share dealer,
even in the initialization phase. In [57], this self-organizing trust relationship is used to
build a secure routing protocol out of an incomplete set of security associations. In [58],
Cˇapkun et al. show that mobility can enhance security in mobile ad hoc networks based
on the fully self-organizing security associations.
Their approach is similar to PGP [59,60] in the sense that users issue certificates for
each other based on their personal acquaintances. However, in their proposed system,
certificates are stored and distributed by the users themselves, unlike in PGP, where
this task can be performed by online servers (called certificate directories). Figure 2.7
illustrates a simple example of how PGP works. Bob has issued a certificate to Chris
thus stating that pkChris really is the public key belonging to Chris. Alice has also
issued a certificate to Bob, indicating that pkBob is really the public key belonging to
Bob. Alice also trusts Bob not to issue any false certificates, thus Alice will trust any
certificates issued by him. Therefore having certAlice,Bob and certBob,Chris, Alice can
verify that pkChris is authentic. She can then securely communicate with Chris even




Cert Alice, Bob Cert Bob, Chris
Figure 2.7: An example of a certificate chain
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2.2.3.1 System Overview
The proposed self-organizing public-key management system works in two phases, as
shown in Figure 2.8.
1. Initialization: users construct their local certificate repositories.
2. When two users want to verify the public keys of each other, they merge their
local certificate repositories and try to find appropriate certificate chains within
the merged repository that make the verification possible.
1. 2.
i i j
Figure 2.8: Two phases of how the system works
The success of this approach very much depends on the construction of the local cer-
tificate repositories and on the characteristics of the certificate graphs. In a certificate
graph, vertices represent public keys of the users, and the edges represent public-key
certificates issued by the users. Each user stores a local repository of public-key cer-
tificates, which can be considered as a subgraph. These certificates can be placed in
three categories: (1) the certificates issued by the user (outgoing edges); (2) the list
of certificates that others issued for the user (incoming edges); (3) an additional set of
certificates chosen according to some algorithm.
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In [21,49,50], Cˇapkun et al. propose several repository construction algorithms and
study their performance. The proposed algorithms take into account the characteristics
of the certificate graphs in the sense that the choice of the certificates that are stored by
each user depends on the connectivity of the user and her certificate graph neighbors.
More precisely, each user stores in her local repository several directed and mutually
disjoint paths of certificates. Each path begins at the user herself, and each certificate
on the path is chosen from the set of certificates that are connected to the last selected
user on the path in such a way that the chosen certificate leads to a user that has the
highest number of certificates connected to her (i.e., the highest vertex degree). This
algorithm is called the Maximum Degree Algorithm, as the local repository construction
criterion is the degree of the vertices in the certificate graph.
In a second, more sophisticated algorithm, certificates are selected into the local
repositories based on the number of the shortcut certificates connected to the users.
Here, a shortcut certificate is defined as a certificate such that when it is removed
from the graph, the shortest path between the two users previously connected by this
certificate becomes strictly larger than two. This algorithm is called the Shortcut Hunter
Algorithm.
2.2.3.2 Weaknesses
This method has a few weaknesses. Firstly, before being able to perform key authen-
tication, each user must first build her local certificate repository. Such initialization
phase is relatively expensive (in terms of bandwidth and time). Although the authors
claim that such operations are performed rarely, other protocols, such as those in [1–3],
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can help each node obtain its certificate with less costly initialization process, and such
process is also performed once only.
Secondly, the local repositories become obsolete if a large number of certificates are
revoked, as then the certificate chains are no longer valid; the same comment applies
in the case when the certificate graph changes significantly (e.g., a large number of
new users join the system). Authors argue that key revocations occur very rarely as
the user-key bindings that are expressed by certificates do not change very frequently.
Such claim is not true in ad hoc networks, since the probability of physical compromises
of nodes is much higher than in wired networks. And such attack leads to certificate
revocations of compromised nodes.
Thirdly, to achieve better assurance about the user-key binding, authentication met-
rics is used. However, deciding which metric is the most appropriate for applications in
ad hoc networks remains an open issue. Even if such a metric exists, the dynamic prop-
erty of certificate revocation results in very high computation costs in reconstructing
local certificate repositories of all the nodes.
Finally, the metric’s confidence in someone’s honesty can be easily cheated, as any
user can create an arbitrary number of public keys and issue many false certificates.
Other metrics can also be defined, but currently there is no efficient metric that can be
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Table 2.1: Comparison of key management schemes for ad hoc networks
2.2.4 Summary
In Table 2.1, we summarize previous research work in key management for ad hoc
networks, in terms of the existence of online/oﬄine CAs and the responsibility of a
normal node in certification services.
[18,46] exploit the idea of secret sharing to achieve robust key management in highly
dynamic environments, such as ad hoc networks. They aim at key servers only, and
assume the existence of a group of online CAs. Therefore, partially distributed key
management is not suitable for purely ad hoc networks. Following efforts [1–3, 19, 20,
47, 48] extend the secret sharing process to normal nodes. Every node in the network
holds a share of the global secret key that can be used to sign a new certificate. A
certain number (i.e. the threshold of the secret sharing scheme employed) of nodes can
cooperate together to assign a certificate to a new node. Current fully distributed key
management schemes work fine when the size of the network is small. Unfortunately,
it becomes either insecure or inefficient when the size of the network increases, and it
is also vulnerable to active attacks. As shown in Table 2.1, self-organizing public key
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management [21,49,50] has an advantage that it does not require the existence of either
online or oﬄine CAs1. However, there still exist many problems to be solved, e.g. reduce
the cost of the initialization phase and find appropriate authentication metrics, before
being employed in practice.
2.3 Privacy and Anonymity on the Internet
Previous research work on privacy and anonymity on the Internet concentrate on two
issues: user anonymity and anonymous communication. User anonymity aims at pro-
viding the users anonymity while they are using the network by letting them hide their
identity from the communicating peers. Research on anonymous communication fo-
cuses on providing a communication channel that is immune to traffic analysis so that
the communicating parties can be anonymous against the eavesdroppers.
2.3.1 Mix
The basic building block for achieving privacy and anonymity on the Internet was pre-
sented by David Chaum in 1981 [61]. This basic building block is called a mix. A
Mix accepts pieces of encrypted e-mail for delivery from many sources, holds, re-sorts,
possibly introduces null mail, rewrites the from address, and possibly sends the mail
to another mix for delivery. The end goal is each piece of output mail is equally likely
to have come from any original sender. Generically, Mixes need not accept only email,
it will become clear from the context what the Mixes in each protocol accept. The
1In this table, CA means the certificate authority that is trusted by all the users in the network.
Thus, we say there is no CA in self-organizing public key management, although in each node can act
as a CA and assign other nodes certificates
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following anonymous protocols base their anonymity on his work.
2.3.2 User Anonymity
Anonymizer [62] is a user anonymity solution, which prevents online tracking by blocking
the real IP address of the user. Users can achieve anonymity by rerouting their HTTP
connections through the Anonymizer, which replaces the information in the connection
so that the websites cannot infer the users’ identities. This approach has the problem
of a centralized trusted entity. The Anonymizer site can track all the anonymous user
activities and is also a single point of failure.
In [63], Reiter and Rubin introduce a system called Crowds for protecting users’
anonymity on the Internet. Crowds extends the idea of Anonymizer by introducing
many computers in the communication path between the initiator (web-surfer) and the
receiver (the web server). In this manner, no single point of failure compromises the
sender’s anonymity. Upon receiving one request, each member of Crowds can either
submit the request directly to the end server or forward it to another random chosen
member based on a certain probability. When the request is eventually submitted, it
is submitted by a random member, thus preventing the end server from identifying its
true initiator. Crowds provides sender anonymity, not receiver, because the end server
is contacted by the last member directly.
WebMIX [64] provide a system similar to Crowds [63] and Hordes [65, 66], but ad-
dresses some of the vulnerabilities inherent in Mix-based systems. In particular, a ticket-
based authentication system is presented to prevent DoS attacks. In such a system,
participants on the network are issued a ticket to use the network. If the participant de-
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sires to communicate anonymously, she redeems her ticket and sends her message. This
prevents users from flooding the network with traffic, WebMIX also addresses Mixes
that drop messages or break messages by changing their contents. Each Mix will digi-
tally sign each message as a sign that it did not tamper with the message. When a Mix
cannot verify the digital signature of a given message, it flags a signature error. Each
Mix is then forced to verify that it did not tamper with the message by publishing the
encrypted message it received and its decrypted version.
2.3.3 Anonymous Communication
In [65, 66], Shields and Levine present a protocol, Hordes, for providing anonymous
communication in the Internet. Hordes builds on the Crowds work [63], instead of
serving as a proxy for a HTTP connection, the Mixes in Hordes serve as proxies for UDP
connections. Path creation works analogous to Crowds, however, a multicast return is
used instead of the reverse path. When an initiator sends a request, a multicast address
is picked on which return responses should be broadcast. Hordes provides only sender
anonymity, not receiver, because at some point the last Mix makes a connection to the
end receiver. Unless the receiver also participates in an anonymous protocol, an attacker
may perceive it as receiving data (and possibly responding).
One approach for anonymous communication is Onion Routing [67]. Such approach
requires a set of onion routers, and anonymous connections through the network are
multiplexed over longstanding socket connections among onion routers. One advantage
of this approach is that, each onion router can only identify the previous and next hop
router along a route, and data cannot be tracked en route. However, the sequence of
39
onion routers in a route is strictly defined at connection setup. When a participant
desires to send a message, they a priori choose a set of onion routers, encrypt their
message in the public keys of the Onion Routers and send the message, or onion on its
way. Onion routing tries to make an initiator’s request appear equally likely to come
from any onion router. Therefore, sender anonymity is provided in onion routing.
Tor [68] is the next generation onion router which many improvements over the old
onion routing design. For example, Tor separates the line between anonymity and “data
cleansing”. Data cleansing is the process of removing personal information (e.g. cookies,
Active X Objects, etc), from message such as requests to web servers (HTTP). Many
web servers will tag visitors with cookies to track user activity and discover how often
visitors come back. Removal of this information is important to maintaining anonymity,
Tor suggests the use of Privoxy [69], when using Tor to communicate anonymously. Tor
also addresses the need for receiver anonymity or location-hidden services by introducing
“rendezvous points”2. Location-hidden services allow the receiver to offer a TCP service,
such as a web server, without revealing his IP address. This type of anonymity protects
against distributed DoS attacks: attackers are forced to attack the onion routing network
because they do not know the receiver’s IP address.
2.3.4 Summary
Many solutions [61–68] have been proposed for protecting privacy and anonymity in
the Internet environments, and some of them can be used in ad hoc networks as well.
For example, both SDAR [23,70–72] and ANODR [22] make use of the onion structure
2A rendezvous point is an onion router that contains instruction about how to contact a receiver
anonymously.
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proposed in [67]. However, because of several unique characteristics of ad hoc networks
shown in Section 1.2, e.g. no central management, dynamic topology and membership,
energy-constrained operation, and limited physical security, previous solutions workable
in the Internet environments cannot be used directly in ad hoc networks. For example,
in the onion routing scheme [67], an onion proxy undertakes the task of defining the
route. Therefore, if the onion proxy is compromised, the anonymity property of routes
is compromised at the same time. Besides that, the assumption of the existence of such
an onion proxy is unsuitable for purely ad-hoc networks.
2.4 Secure Routing
Outside the ad hoc network community, secure routing in the Internet has received
increased attention. The proposed solutions rely mainly on the existence of a line of
defense, separating the fixed routing infrastructure from all other network entities. This
is achieved by distributing a set of public keys/certificates, which signify the authority
of the router to act within the limits of the employed protocol (e.g., advertise certain
routes), and allow all routing data exchanges to be authenticated, non-repudiated and
protected from tampering. However, such approaches cannot combat a single malicious
router disseminating incorrect topological information. In addition, they are not ap-
plicable in the ad hoc network context because of impediments such as the absence
of a fixed infrastructure and a central entity. More importantly, for an environment
where node mobility and network topology rapidly change, such protocols also have
high communication overhead because they send periodic routing messages even when
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the network is not changing. The provision of comprehensive secure communication
mandates that both data forwarding and route discovery be safeguarded.
Existing ad hoc routing protocols, such as DSR [13, 14] and Ad Hoc On-demand
Distance Vector (AODV) [73,74], are vulnerable to many kinds of attacks. It is fairly
easy to inject fake routing messages or modify legitimate ones such that the operation
of the network would be heavily disturbed (e.g., by creating loops or disconnecting
the network). Therefore, many secure ad hoc routing protocols [16, 17, 45, 75–80] were
proposed to make the routing in ad hoc networks resistant to various kinds of attacks.
However, till recently, researchers begin to consider the anonymity issue [22–25], which
is very important in ad hoc environments where the trust relationship between users is
relatively weak.
2.4.1 Generic Secure Routing and Data Forwarding Protocols for Ad
Hoc Networks
In this section, we review prior research in generic secure routing and data forwarding
protocols for ad hoc networks. “Generic” in the context of this section means that,
in these protocols, the authors consider only security requirements, and do not take
additional requirements, e.g. anonymity, into account.
2.4.1.1 Promiscuously Auditing on Next Node
In [75], Marti et al. propose two mechanisms for detecting packet dropping. One is
to detect misbehaving nodes and report such events, and the other is to maintain a
set of metrics reflecting the past behavior of other nodes. The main idea behind is that
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nodes work in the promiscuous mode, and overhear the transmissions of their successors.
Not only do these nodes verify whether the packet was forwarded to the downstream
node, but they also check the integrity of the forwarded packet. The assumptions for
the above-mentioned work include a shared medium, bi-directional links, use of source
routing (i.e., packets carry the entire route that becomes known to all intermediate
nodes), and no colluding malicious nodes. It is also called as the Watchdog method.
Figure 2.9 illustrates an example to show how it works. A packet is transferred from
S toward D through A, B, and C in sequence. After forwarding the packet to B, A can
overhear B’s transmission and verify that B has attempted to pass the correct packet to
C. The solid line represents the intended direction of the packet sent by B to C, while
the dashed line indicates that A is within transmission range of B and can overhear the
packet transfer. Once a misbehaving node is detected, a report is generated and nodes
update the rating of the reported misbehaving node. Because nodes may choose the
best route comprised of relatively well-behaved nodes during data forwarding, the node
which previously launched the packet dropping attack is bypassed.
S A B C D
Figure 2.9: An Example of The Watchdog Method
The watchdog method exploits two features of ad hoc networks, namely, shared chan-
nel and source routing. Nevertheless, the plausibility of this solution is questionable for
several reasons, and in fact the authors themselves provide a short list of scenarios of
incorrect detection: (1) ambiguous collisions, (2) receiver collisions, (3) limited trans-
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mission power, (4) false misbehavior, (5) collusion, and (6) partial dropping.
2.4.1.2 Secure Message Transmission
Secure Message Transmission (SMT) [76,77] is a secure data forwarding protocol pro-
posed by Papadimitratos and Haas. Given a topology view of the network, SMT deter-
mines a set of diverse paths between the source and the destination. Then, it introduces
limited transmission redundancy across the paths, by dispersing a message into N pieces,
so that successful reception of any M -out-of-N pieces allows the reconstruction of the
original message at the destination. Upon reception of a number of pieces, the desti-
nation generates an acknowledgement informing the source of which pieces, and thus
routes, were intact. In order to enhance the robustness of the feedback mechanism, the
small-sized acknowledgments are maximally dispersed (i.e., successful reception of at
least one piece is sufficient) and are protected by the protocol header as well.
SMT takes advantage of topological and transmission redundancies and utilizes feed-
back, exchanged only between the two communicating end-nodes, and thus remains ef-
fective even under highly adverse conditions. It does not impose processing overhead
on intermediate nodes, while the end nodes make the routing decisions, based on the
feedback provided by the destination and the underlying topology discovery and route
maintenance protocols. Besides that, the fault-tolerance of SMT is enhanced by the
adaptation of the ratio of required pieces to the total number of pieces. It can ensure
100% successful data transmission, even if 10 to 20 percent of the network nodes are
malicious. The main weakness of SMT is that it is based on the correctness of the
topological and routing information, which unfortunately has limited protection.
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2.4.1.3 Secure-AODV
In [78], Zapata proposes the Secure-AODV (S-AODV) scheme to protect the AODV
[73, 74] routing protocol. S-AODV assumes that each node has certified public keys of
all network nodes, so that intermediate nodes can validate all in-transit routing packets.
More specifically, the sender appends an RSA signature [52] and the last element of a
hash chain [81] (i.e., the result of hashing a random number for n times). When the
message is forwarded, intermediate nodes validate the signature and the hash value,
generate the k-th3 element of the hash chain and place it in the packet.
The main weaknesses of S-AODV includes: (1) the IP portion of the S-AODV pack-
ets can be easily compromised; (2) intermediate nodes can pretend that they are the
neighbor of the destination, advertise arbitrarily high sequence numbers, and modify the
route length; (3) the use of public-key cryptography imposes a high processing overhead
on the intermediate nodes; (4) certificates are bound with fixed IP addresses. However,
in ad hoc networks, newly-joined nodes may be assigned a IP address dynamically (e.g.,
DHCP [82]) or even randomly (e.g., Zero-Configuration [83]).
2.4.1.4 Secure Routing Protocol
Panagiotis Papadimitratos and Zygmunt Haas propose the Secure Routing Protocol
(SRP) [17], which can be used with DSR [13, 14] or the IntErzone Routing Protocol
(IERP) [84] in the Zone Routing Protocol (ZRP) [85, 86]. SRP requires a security
association only between communicating nodes and uses this security association to au-
thenticate route requests and route replies through the use of message authentication
3k is the number of traversed hops.
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codes. The novelty of the scheme is that false route replies, as a result of malicious node
behavior, are discarded partially by good nodes while in-transit towards the querying
node, or deemed invalid upon reception.
SRP does not attempt to prevent unauthorized modification of fields. For example,
a node can freely remove or corrupt the node list of a route request packet that it
forwards. Besides that, to limit flooding, in SRP nodes record the rate at which each
neighbor forwards route request packets, and gives priority to those route request packets
sent through neighbors that less frequently forward the route request packets. Such
techniques exacerbate the problem of greedy nodes. For example, a node that does not
forward the route request packets gets a higher priority when it initiates route discovery.
2.4.1.5 Authenticated Routing for Ad-hoc Networks
The Authenticated Routing for Ad-hoc Networks (ARAN) secure routing protocol [16]
proposed by Dahill et al. is conceived as an on-demand routing protocol that detects
and protects against malicious actions carried out by third parties and peers in the
ad hoc environment. ARAN introduces authentication, message integrity and non-
repudiation as part of a minimal security policy for the ad hoc environment and consists
of a preliminary certification process, a mandatory end-to-end authentication stage and
an optional second stage that provides secure shortest paths.
The ARAN protocol protects against exploits using modification, fabrication and
impersonation but the use of asymmetric cryptography makes it a very costly protocol
to use in terms of CPU and energy usage. Furthermore, ARAN is not immune to the
wormhole attack.
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2.4.1.6 Secure Efficient Ad Hoc Distance Vector Routing Protocol
Hu, Perrig and Johnson present a proactive secure routing protocol, Secure Efficient Ad-
hoc Distance Vector Routing Protocol (SEAD) [79], based on the Destination-Sequenced
Distance Vector protocol (DSDV) [87]. In a proactive (or periodic) routing protocol
nodes periodically exchange routing information with other nodes in attempt to have
each node always know a current route to all destinations. Specifically, SEAD is inspired
by the DSDV-SQ version of the DSDV protocol. The DSDV-SQ version of the DSDV
protocol has been shown to outperform other DSDV versions in previous ad hoc networks
simulations [88,89].
SEAD deals with attackers that modify routing information broadcasted during the
update phase of the DSDV-SQ protocol: in particular, routing can be disrupted if the
attacker modifies the sequence number and the metric field of a routing table update
message. Replay attacks are also taken into account. SEAD does not cope with worm-
hole attacks though the authors propose, as in the ARIADNE protocol [45], to use the
TIK protocol to detect the threat.
2.4.1.7 Ariadne: A Secure On-Demand Routing Protocol for Ad Hoc Net-
works
In [45], Hu, Perrig and Johnson present an on-demand secure ad hoc routing proto-
col based on DSR that withstands node compromise and relies only on highly efficient
symmetric cryptography. Ariadne guarantees that the target node of a route discovery
process can authenticate the initiator, that the initiator can authenticate each interme-
diate node on the path to the destination present in the RREP message and that no
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intermediate node can remove a previous node in the node list in the RREQ or RREP
messages. As for the SRP protocol, Ariadne needs some mechanism to bootstrap au-
thentic keys required by the protocol. In particular, each node needs a shared secret key
(KSD, is the shared key between a source S and a destination D) with each node it com-
municates with at a higher layer, an authentic TESLA [90,91] key for each node in the
network and an authentic “Route Discovery chain” element for each node for which this
node will forward RREQ messages. Ariadne provides point-to-point authentication of a
routing message using a message authentication code and a shared key between the two
parties. However, for authentication of a broadcast packet such as RREQ, Ariadne uses
the TESLA broadcast authentication protocol. Ariadne copes with attacks performed
by malicious nodes that modify and fabricate routing information, with attacks using
impersonation and, in an advanced version, with the wormhole attack. Selfish nodes are
not taken into account.
2.4.1.8 Packet Leashes: A Defense against Wormhole Attacks in Wireless
Ad Hoc Networks
Hu, Perrig and Johnson propose an approach to detect a wormhole based on packet
leashes [80]. There are two types of packet leashes: geographical and temporal.
The main idea of packet leashes is that by authenticating either an extremely precise
timestamp or location information combined with a loose timestamp, a receiver can
determine if the packet has traversed an unrealistic distance for the specific network
technology used. Temporal leashes rely on extremely precise time synchronization and
timestamps in each packet. We can approximate a packet’s travel time as the difference
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between the receive time and the timestamp. To be more conservative, however, a node
can choose to add the maximum time synchronization error, assuming that the sender’s
clock might be faster than the receiver’s. Conversely, to allow all direct communication
between legitimate nodes, a node can subtract the maximum time synchronization error,
assuming that the sender’s clock might be slower than the receiver’s.
2.4.2 Anonymous Routing Protocols for Ad Hoc Networks
Among anonymous routing protocols proposed for ad hoc networks, only SDAR [23,
70–72] and ANODR [22] aim at pure ad hoc networks. In contrast, other anonymous
routing or anonymous communication protocols are based on additional assumptions,
e.g. AO2P [25] assumes the existence of a secure position service system.
2.4.2.1 SDAR: A Secure Distributed Anonymous Routing Protocol
In [23, 70–72], the authors propose a Secure Distributed Anonymous Routing (SDAR)
protocol for ad hoc wireless networks, which is based on the onion routing protocol
[67]. SDAR does not require the source node to gather and store information about
the network topology. Instead, the source node initiates a path establishment process
by broadcasting a path discovery message with certain trust requirements to all its
neighboring nodes. The protocol is explained briefly as follows.
Firstly, the source node initiates a path establishment process by broadcasting a
path discovery message with certain trust requirements to all of neighboring nodes. The




TY PE, TRUST REQ, TPK, EPKR(IDR, KS , PLS), PS ,




TY PE— the message type.
TRUST REQ— the trust requirement.
TPK/TSK— the temporary one-time public/private key.
PKS/PKR — the public key of the sender/receiver.
IDS/IDR — the identity of the sender/receiver.
KS — a symmetric (session) key generated by the sender.
PLS — the padding length set by the sender.
PS — a padding implemented by the sender.
SNSession IDS — a random number generated by the source for the current session.
MS — MS = H(TY PE, TRUST REQ, TPK, TSK, IDR, KS , IDS , PKS ,
SNSession IDS , PLS , PS).
SignS(MS)— MS is signed with the private key of the source node S.
When a node i receives a path discovery message, it processes the message according
to the following steps: (1) check if the message has already been received from other
nodes; (2) check if the node is the sender’s intended next hop; (3) check if the node is
the destined receiver.
If the node is not the intended receiver, it adds a message which is encrypted with
the TPK, and then forwards the new message to the neighbors whose trust level meets
the source node’s trust requirement. The format of the information appended is shown
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in Expression 2.5. Besides that, node i needs to record 〈Session IDi, IDi−1, Ki〉 to
the internal mapping table.
ETPK(IDi, Ki, SNSession IDi , SignIDi(MIDi)) (2.5)
where
IDi — the identity of node i.
Ki — a symmetric (session) key generated by node i.
Session IDi — a random number generated by node i source for the current
session.
MIDi — MIDi = H(Mprev, IDi, Ki, Session IDi), and Mprev is the cumulative
message that node i gets from its ancestor node i− 1.
SignIDi(MIDi) — MIDi is signed with the private key of node i.
If the node is the destined receiver, it first recovers the session keys for all the nodes
along the path of the message. Afterwards, the destination generates a path reverse
message, and then sends the message to the first node in the reverse path. Given that
there are n nodes between the source and the destination along the path discovered, the
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SNSession IDn−1, SNSession IDn−3 , H(Mn−3), HKn−1(Nn−1)),





SNSession IDS−1 — a random number that haves the same number of bits as any
regular SNSession IDj and is generated by the source node.
P — a padding that has the same length as any Mj .
Mi — Mi = (EKi−1(Mi−2), SNSession IDi , SNSession IDi−2, H(Mi−2), HKi(Ni)),
whereH(M) and HKi(M) are a one-way hash function and a keyed hash func-
tion using Ki as the key, respectively.
Ni — Ni = (EKi(Mi−1), SNSession IDi , SNSession IDi−2, HKi(Ni)).
Each intermediate node that receives the path reverse message uses the SNSession IDi
to retrieve the key for the session, removes one encryption layer, and forwards the
message to the next node on the reverse path to the source node. The ID of the node
from which the message was received is added to the successor node entry corresponding
to the random number into the mapping table. When the source node receives the
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message, it decrypts the message and passes the information about all the intermediate
nodes (i.e., the route) to the higher application.
SDAR can protect the identities of the source and the destination from other nodes.
In addition, it also ensures the route anonymity in the sense that adversaries outside
the route have no knowledge about any node en route. However, there exist several
weaknesses in SDAR. Firstly, the destination knows the identities of intermediate nodes
en route so that a pair of adversaries can launch the protocol to collect the identities
of other nodes in the network. Besides that, in SDAR, the authors add padding only
to the original route request and route reply packets, while in the middle part of the
route the route request and route reply packets are forwarded without being padded.
As such, adversaries can easily deduce the distance from themselves to the source, even
if they are not in the route discovered. Furthermore, the efficiency of this protocol is
not good, and thus is vulnerable to DOS attacks, especially during the stage of flooding
the RREQ packets.
2.4.2.2 ANODR: An ANonymous On Demand Routing Protocol
In [22], Kong et al. design the ANonymous On Demand Routing (ANODR) protocol.
The design of ANODR is based on “broadcast with trapdoor information”4, a novel net-
work security concept which includes features of two existing network and security mech-
anisms, namely “broadcast” and “trapdoor information”. Similar to Hordes [65,66], AN-
ODR explores multicast/broadcast to improve recipient anonymity. However, ANODR
is an on-demand protocol, and it extensively explores trapdoor information in broad-
4Given that f : X → Y is a trapdoor one-way function, trapdoor information is the secret that make
the operation of finding preimages for y ∈ Y feasible.
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cast. These features are not discussed in Hordes’ multicast mechanisms. In [22]. Kong
et al. propose three different variants of ANODR: ANODR-PO (Protected Onion),
ANODR-BO (Boomerang Onion), and ANODR-TBO (Trapdoor Boomerang Onion).
Among them, ANODR-TBO is the most efficient one. Therefore, we only introduce this
protocol here.
Anonymous route discovery in ANODR consists of two phase: route request denoted
as RREQ and route response denoted as RREP. In [22], a communication source initiates
the route discovery procedure by assembling an RREQ packet and locally broadcasting
it. The RREQ packet is of the format shown in Expression 2.7.
< RREQ, seqnum, pkone, KT (dest, Kc), Kc(dest), TBO > (2.7)
where
seqnum— a globally unique sequence number.
pkone — one-time public key from a public/private key pair (pkone, skone) gener-
ated by the forwarding node.
KT — a secret key that the source shares with the destination.
dest — the destination tag.
Kc — a commitment key.
TBO — a cryptographic onion that is critical for route pseudonym establishment.
The format of the RREP packet is shown in Expression 2.8.
< RREP, {Kseed}pkone , Kseed(K ′c, TBO) > (2.8)
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where
Kseed — a locally unique random route pseudonym.
K ′c — the anonymous proof presented by the destination. Any forwarding node




Here ANODR employs “trapdoor commitment”, a cryptographic concept explores
the collision-resistant property of one-way functions. That is, given an output of one-
way function Kc(dest), it is computationally hard to find the input, or another input
collision that can produce the same output. In ANODR, it makes use of the trapdoor
commitment protocol proposed in TESLA [92]. In TESLA, the output of a one-way func-
tion is published as a commitment before the corresponding input is revealed. When
both the input and output are available, any verifier can efficiently validate the commit-
ment by applying the one-way function on them. In ANODR, Kc(dest) embedded in
RREQ packet is a public commitment made for the destination by the source. Later the
destination node can present the input Kc as the proof of furnishing the commitment.
As to trapdoor boomerang onions, Figure 2.10 shows how they are compute, using
an example of finding a path from A to E. When intermediate forwarding node, e.g. B,
sees an RREQ packet, it embeds a random nonce NB to the boomerang onion, encrypts
the result with a random symmetric key KB , then broadcasts the RREQ locally. The
trapdoor information consists of NB and KB, and is only known to node B. The
boomerang onion will be bounced back by the destination. After each local RREP
broadcast, only the next hop (i.e., the previous hop in RREQ phase) can correctly open
the trapdoor it made in the RREQ phase, hence the result is equivalent to a wireless
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unicast. Then the node strips a layer of the boomerang onion and locally broadcasts
the modified RREP packet.
A B C D E
TBOA TBOB TBOC TBOD
TBOA TBOB TBOC TBOD
TBO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  =  KA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  =  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B(NB, KA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C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C, KB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B, 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, K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C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B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, 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Figure 2.10: ANODR-TBO: anonymous route discovery using trapdoor boomerang
onion (a single path showed from source A to destination E)
Compared to [23, 70–72], Kong et al. give a more comprehensive analysis on the
anonymity and security properties achieved, and provide detailed simulation results on
the efficiency of ANODR. In addition, ANODR is more efficient than SDAR at the data
transmission stage.
Unfortunately, ANODR still has two main weaknesses. One is that the identity
of the destination is known at least to the forwarding nodes en route, because they
need this information to verify the validity of the RREP packet received. In fact, since
the destination or the forwarding node cannot know in advance which neighbor is the
next node along the route, it has to disclose the identity of the destination to all the
neighbors. The other weakness is that, although ANODR can prevent adversaries from
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knowing the exact location of the source or the destination, it is still possible for an
internal adversary, i.e. an adversary en route, to deduce the distance, i.e. the number
of hops, from itself to the source.
2.4.2.3 AO2P: Ad hoc On-demand Position-based Private Routing Protocol
Wu and Bhargava propose an anonymous routing protocol in [25], i.e. AO2P, in which
the real identities of the source nodes, the destination nodes, and the forwarding nodes
in the end-to-end connections are kept private. The format of the route request frame




















Bytes 1 4 6 10 4 1
Figure 2.11: Frame of rreq message in AO2P routing protocol
As shown in Figure 2.11, AO2P does not provide location privacy, because the po-
sition of the destination is exposed in the network for route discovery. In addition,
because the distance from the source to the destination is included in the route request,
the location of the source in fact is also partially disclosed. AO2P assumes the existence
of a secure position service system, which requires a number of fixed servers, and thus
is not suitable for purely mobile ad hoc networks.
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2.4.2.4 Other Anonymous Communication Protocols in Ad Hoc Networks
In [24], Zhang et al. propose an anonymous communication protocol, termed MASK.
In this protocol, the authors assume that each node is assigned a large set PSi of
collision resistant pseudonyms by an off-line Trusted Authority (TA) beforehand. It
cannot generate random pseudonyms by itself. Due to the limitation of storage on ad
hoc network nodes, they cannot store a large number of pseudonyms, and thus these
pseudonyms may be used out soon. Even worse, an adversary can launch a simple Denial
of Service attack as follows. Adversary X sends out a request of mutual authentication
using a fake (e.g. random generated) pseudonym to node Y . According to the scheme, Y
will disclose one of pseudonyms assigned. Then the adversary moves around and sends
such fake requests repeatedly, which either results in that the pre-assigned pseudonyms
are used out in a short time, or let node Y refuse all the following requests. More
importantly, in MASK, one RREQ message consumes one pseudonym of each node
that could be reached by the source directly or indirectly. Besides that, MASK does
not provide identity anonymity, because the real identifier of the destination node is
disclosed to all the nodes en route during the route discovery process.
Cˇapkun et al. study the secure and privacy-preserving communications problem in
hybrid ad hoc networks in [93]. Their scheme is based on the assumption that there




One active area of securing mobile ad-hoc networks is secure routing. Many solutions,
such as ARAN [16], S-AODV [78], SRP [17], Ariadne [45], SEAD [79], have been pro-
posed for protecting popular routing protocols, such as AODV [73, 74], DSR [13, 14],
and DSDV [87], from various passive and active attacks. However, due to some inher-
ent limitations resulting from anonymity-related requirements, those solutions cannot
be employed directly in anonymous routing protocols. For example, in [16], forwarding
nodes need to verify route request and route reply packets with the source’s and the
destination’s certificates. This conflicts with the goal of protecting the anonymity of the
two communication parties in anonymous routing protocols.
Anonymous routing is a new and challenging field within secure routing. Current
research work [22–25,93] only provide limited anonymity properties, and are vulnerable
to specific attacks. Therefore, it is highly desirable and challenging to design a new
anonymous routing protocol that can satisfy all the anonymity and security-related




for Large Ad Hoc Networks
To overcome the challenges described in Section 1.5.1, i.e. scalability, flexibility, adap-
tivity, efficiency, security and robustness, we provide approaches at both the architecture
and the algorithm level.
At the architecture level, we propose AKM which is based on a hierarchical structure
and secret sharing to distribute cryptographic keys and provide certification services. In
order to be employed in ad hoc networks, AKM is designed with several characteristics
that are different from previous hierarchical key management schemes [94, 95]. Firstly,
the hierarchical structure of AKM is a logical tree in which all the leaf nodes represent
real wireless devices, while all the branch nodes only exist logically. In other words,
AKM does not require the existence of real branch nodes (i.e. trusted key servers in
[94, 95]), and thus is suitable for purely ad hoc environments. Secondly, flexibility and
adaptivity can be obtained in AKM, since not only the structure of key management
may change according to the increase/decrease of nodes, but also different parts of
the structure have the freedom to set appropriate configurations to cope with various
levels of risks. In addition, simulation results show that computation costs due to the
dynamic property of ad hoc networks are very small under common threshold and region
size settings. Thirdly, in AKM, secret keys of all branch nodes originate from one global
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secret key either directly or indirectly. The secret key of each branch node is shared
by its sub-nodes (either branch nodes or leaf nodes) using the Shamir secret sharing
scheme [30]. Such secret sharing is performed recursively from top down to the lowest
level. This characteristic allows us to issue certificates with different levels of assurance.
Once AKM is in operation, each real node holds a secret share which is used co-
operatively with other nodes to maintain distributed key management services, such as
assigning a secret share or a certificate to a newly-joined node.
At the algorithm level, we propose two algorithms, which are based on threshold
cryptography and VSS [26, 27] and are independent from AKM. Both algorithms can
resist active attacks. Given that there is no communication error, our first algorithm
can assign a certificate within one round with help from a group of 2k−1 nodes, in spite
of active attacks. In contrast, the second algorithm involves help from only k nodes,
although it may need more than one round to assign a certificate. Here, one round is
defined to be the whole procedure that begins from a node requesting to be assigned
a new certificate or renew its certificate to the combination and validation process of
the certificate assigned or renewed. Simulation results show that, compared to the
previous work [1–3, 19, 20], our second algorithm is not only much faster in a friendly
environment, but it also works well in a hostile environment in which existing schemes
work poorly. Furthermore, the process of generating partial certificates in our second
algorithm is extremely fast. Such an advantage is critical in ad hoc networks where
intrinsically the less help a node requests from its neighbors, the higher is the chance
of obtaining the help. Consequently, using our second algorithm, a node can easily find
enough neighboring nodes that provide the certification service.
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3.1 Autonomous Key Management for Large Ad Hoc Net-
works
In this section, we first give an example to show the method of constructing the hi-
erarchical structure in AKM, instead of presenting the details of the scheme, such as
notation and definitions, directly.


































Figure 3.1: An example of constructing the hierarchical structure in AKM
Suppose that, at the beginning, there are two users who are physically nearby and
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can communicate directly with each other. However, they do not trust each other.
Therefore, they decide to generate a (2, 2) secret sharing system cooperatively1. A
distributed VSS scheme (e.g., the one proposed in [96]) can be employed, since it is not
suitable to assume the existence of a TTP in purely ad hoc networks. The structure
of AKM at the initial stage is shown as Figure 3.1(a), where the squares and circles
represent real nodes (i.e. physical devices) and logical nodes, respectively. Each user
holds a share Bi (i = 1, 2) of the secret A, where i is the identity of the user in the
group, but none of them can deduce A by themselves. The secret can only be recovered
under the cooperation of at least two users.
Afterwards, when a new user wants to join this group, she requires help from at least
two members currently in the group. Once the new user is accepted, she is assigned with
a new share of A corresponding to her identity (e.g. 3 in Figure 3.1(b)) in the group.
And the configuration of the secret sharing system is changed from (2, 2) to (3, 2), as
shown in Figure 3.1(b). This “Join” operation is explained in detail in Section 3.2.2.1.
Although the shares held by the current members are refreshed periodically to protect
the shared secret, the system becomes more and more insecure when more and more
users join the group. Suppose that, in our example, members in the group think that
the system is insecure when the ratio of the threshold of the secret sharing system to
the number of users in the group is less than 0.4. Thus, when the number of users reach
six (as shown in Figure 3.1(c)), members in the group have to divide themselves into a
few groups, such as two groups in the example. More specifically, B1, B2 and B3 form a
1In some cases, if all the initial users think that the number of adversaries among them is less than
a value k at that time, the threshold of the initial secret sharing system could be set to k, which is less
than the number of initial users.
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new group, members of which share a newly-generated secret B7. Similarly, B4, B5 and
B6 form another group and share the secret B8. The resulting structure of AKM after
the division is shown in Figure 3.1(d). This operation increases the height of the tree
structure, and is called the “Expansion” operation, which is to be explained in detail
in Section 3.2.2.5. In AKM, B7 and B8 are generated in such a way that both of them
are shares of the initial secret A. However, the secret sharing configurations within two
newly-formed groups are independent from each other, and are determined by users that
are initial members in the newly-created group. In this example, C1, C2 and C3 (i.e.
B1, B2 and B3) totally distrust each other and employ a (3, 3) secret sharing scheme
within group Ci. In contrast, D1, D2 and D3 (i.e. B4, B5 and B6) think that there are
less than two adversaries among them between consecutive secret share updates. Thus,
they choose a (3, 2) secret sharing scheme. Note that, as shown in Figure 3.1(d), the
branch nodes holding B7 and B8 are logical nodes, and thus do not exist in reality. And
secrets B7 and B8 are neither stored on any real node nor recovered explicitly at a later
time.
Similarly, when more and more users want to join group Ci (i = 1, 2, 3) or group Di
(i = 1, 2, 3), they need help from at least k users in that group, where k is the threshold
of the secret sharing configuration of that group (i.e. k = 3 for group Ci, and k = 2 for
group Di).
As shown in this example, the main challenge of designing AKM is to adapt the key
management scheme to the dynamic environment like ad hoc networks securely (e.g. any
secret held by the newly-generated virtual nodes should never be disclosed explicitly)
and efficiently (e.g. the computation cost due to the membership variations should be
64
acceptable). In the following few sections, we first define the concepts used in AKM and
present the assumptions employed in AKM in Section 3.1.2 and Section 4.2, respectively.
In Section 3.1.4, we indicate the generic method of generating public/private key pairs
and the secret shares of nodes in AKM, analyze the trade-off between the storage and
the ability of assigning certificates with different levels of assurance, and show that
how AKM can be scalable in terms of storage. In the same section, we also discuss
about other characteristics provided by AKM, including self-organizing, adaptivity, and
flexibility. Afterwards, we classify the membership-changing operations, and present
the algorithms that achieve scalable and secure share updating in those operations in
Section 3.2. In Section 3.4.3, we implement the two most costly membership-changing
operations, and measure their costs under different settings.
3.1.2 Notation and Definitions
Here we explain the definitions of some concepts used in this paper, using a four-level
ad hoc network system (shown in Figure 3.2) as the example:
• Real Nodes: the leaf nodes in the hierarchical structure of AKM. They have
their own personal PKI key pairs, and they are corresponding to real devices in
ad hoc networks. In Figure 3.2, node A to R are real nodes.
• Virtual Nodes: the branch nodes in the hierarchical structure of AKM. They are
virtual and thus do not represent real devices in ad hoc networks. In Figure 3.2,
the root node and node S to Z are virtual nodes.
• Master Node: the branch node that a node originates directly from. For exam-
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Figure 3.2: A four-level ad hoc network system
• Region: consists of all the real and virtual nodes originating directly from the
same virtual node. Each virtual node corresponds to a region. For example, region
T consists of real node D to F, and region Z consists of virtual node V to X.
• Overall Region Size (ORS): the number of nodes which possess secret shares
originated from the same secret, i.e. the secret key of the same region, between
two consecutive secret share updates of this region. For example, we assume that
Figure 3.2 shows the structure of the network just after a secret share update. At
this time, the ORS of region S is 3. If node B leaves region S, the ORS of region
S is still 3 until the next secret share update, even though in fact the number of
the nodes currently in region S is 2. We propose this new parameter, in view of
the fact that the leaving node may still keep a secret share of the secret key of the
region.
• Regional Trust Coefficient (RTC): the parameter to indicate how secure a region
is. It is defined as the ratio of the threshold of a region to its ORS.
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• Global Trust Coefficient (GTC): the global lower limit on RTC.
• Identifier (ID): the entity to represent a node.
• Global Secret Key (GSK): the secret key of the whole ad hoc networks system.
• Global Public Key (GPK): the public key of the whole ad hoc networks system.
We use the following notations (shown in Table 3.1):
Table 3.1: Notations in AKM
PKi the public key of a region “i”
SKi the secret share held by node “i”. If node “i” is virtual, the secret share
is also its secret key
IDi the identifier of a node “i”
pki the public key of a real node “i”
ski the secret key of a real node “i”
SKi(M) a message M is signed by SKi
3.1.3 Assumptions
We make the following assumptions in this paper:
1. Each real node i has a personal PKI key pair [pki, ski]. The key pair can be
generated by either a TTP or even the node itself.
2. Each real node joins and leaves the network randomly.
3. Given the public key of any virtual node, including the root node, it is compu-
tationally infeasible to obtain the corresponding secret key.
4. Between any two consecutive secret share updates, the number of adversaries
that hold secret shares originated from the same secret key (i.e. the secret key
of the same region) is less than k. The adversaries may still stay in the region,
or have already left it.
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3.1.4 Design of AKM
In AKM, all the regions’ secret keys originate from GSK either directly or indirectly.
The secret sharing process based on [30] is performed recursively from top down to the
lowest level. Each node in AKM except the root virtual node, either real or virtual,
holds a share of the secret of its master node and a PKI key pair. For a virtual node,
the secret share that it holds is also its secret key, and its public key is generated from
the secret key. In this scheme, we employ an asymmetric cryptographic scheme based on
DLP [53] to generate the region’s public key. For example, given that the secret key of
region i is SKi, its public key can be computed by PKi = g
SKi (mod p). Unlike virtual
nodes, each real node generates its own PKI key pair through some other method, e.g.
by a TTP or even itself. However, it also needs to store a share of the secret key of
its region (i.e. the secret key of its master node). For the sake of clarity, we list how
real nodes and virtual nodes generate their keys in Table 3.2. Note that, to ensure the
security of AKM, the secret key of any virtual node should never be recovered explicitly,
even when we need it to assign a certificate. Instead, partial certificates are generated
individually with those shares of the secret key, and then they are combined to create
the certificate. Details of assigning or renewing certificates are presented in Section 3.3
at a later time.
Table 3.2: Key pairs and secret shares of nodes
Real Node Virtual Node
Secret Share obtained during the secret sharing
process
obtained during the secret sharing
process
Secret Key obtained before the initialization of
AKM
the secret share is used as its secret
key
Public key obtained before the initialization of
AKM
generated from its secret key after
receiving its secret share
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Besides the public key of itself, a real node needs to store public keys of other nodes
in the hierarchical structure, since in purely ad hoc environments like ad hoc networks
we cannot assume the existence of a trusted public server or directory storing public
keys of other members. For a real node with sufficient storages, it will store two kinds
of public keys: (1) public keys of itself and virtual nodes that are on its reverse path to
the root. We denote the group of all these nodes as V ; (2) public keys of nodes that are
within the same region of any member in group V . For instance, in Figure 3.2, node A
needs to store (1) PKA, PKS , PKY and GPK; (2) PKB and PKC (B and C are in
the same region of A), PKT and PKU (T and U are in the same region of S), PKZ (Z
is in the same region of Y ). Public keys of those higher-level virtual nodes are useful,
when we want to verify certificates with different levels of assurance. The generation
of certificates with different levels of assurance is to be presented in Section 3.3.1.3.
However, there is a trade-off between the storage and this new characteristic provided
by AKM. In reality, if a real node has limited storages, it can store a subset of these
public keys. More specifically, it can discard public keys of those nodes that are d levels
higher than it. For instance, in the previous example, when d = 2, public keys stored on
node A consist of (1) PKA, PKS ; (2) PKB and PKC (B and C are in the same region
of A), PKT and PKU (T and U are in the same region of S). The minimum set of
public keys that must be stored on a real node consists of (1) public keys of all the real
nodes in the same region as itself; (2) the public key of its master node. These public
keys are required to assign or renew common certificates (in contrast to certificates with
different levels of assurance), which are signed by the secret key of the real node’s master
node, as presented in Section 3.3. Thus, A should at least store (1) PKA, PKB and
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PKC (A, B, C are within the same region); (2) PKS (S is the master node of A). For
simplicity, we assume that in Figure 3.2 the number of nodes in each region is n, and
the secret sharing process within each region uses the same (n, k) configuration. Given
that the height of the hierarchical structure is denoted as l, in such a system, there are
nl−1 real nodes, and each of them needs to store n+1 (at minimum) to (l− 1)n+1 (at
maximum) public keys instead of storing public keys of all the nl−1 nodes.
AKM is self-organizing, since it does not rely on any TTP or TA at any stage.
During the initialization, as shown in the example in Section 3.1.1, in contrast to [1–
3] in which a TA is required to bootstrap the initial nodes, in AKM the role of the
TA has been replaced by those initial nodes themselves, which jointly generate GSK
using a distributed VSS scheme [96]. In addition, when the environment changes, e.g.
some nodes join or leave, those nodes currently in a group/region would cooperate and
adjust accordingly by themselves. In other words, our solution is adaptive to dynamic
environments without a TTP. Details about node-based and region-based operations are
shown in Section 3.2.2.
It should be absolutely clear that the proposed AKM scheme does not requires a
preset hierarchical structure for all the nodes. If it did, this requirement would be really
inappropriate for ad hoc networks where nodes are highly dynamic and thus we cannot
determine their positions in advance. Instead, AKM only requires a small number of
nodes, which are physically nearby and can communicate directly with each other, during
the initialization. More importantly, the structure of the whole network may vary when
more nodes join or leave. Therefore, the hierarchical structure of the whole network is
adaptive. In the above example, the number of initial nodes needed is only k, and the
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size of this network can be expanded to nl at maximum at a later time. Actually, if
there is no limit on the height of the hierarchical structure in AKM, AKM can contain
nodes of arbitrary size.
Besides adaptivity, another main advantage of AKM is the flexibility of its structure.
Each region2 can determine its own size and the threshold of secret sharing, as long as
it obeys the following rule: its RTC should be no less than GTC. The flexibility of the
threshold parameter is very desirable, since in some cases different regions of an ad hoc
network may face risks of different intensities. Thus, the threshold should not be set to
be globally uniform. Moreover, such property is very useful in balancing the security
and efficiency requirements.
3.2 Scalable Share Updates
In AKM, in order to improve the robustness of share updates, we distribute the func-
tionality of the dealer in the Shamir secret sharing scheme [30] to many real nodes. The
share updating process occurs under two conditions. One is at the time of the regular
periodic renewal of secure shares. The other condition happens during the node-based
and region-based operations.
To ensure the security of share updates, we use proactive secret sharing schemes
[26, 32, 34, 37] to adapt the configuration of secret sharing to variations in a highly
dynamic environment, such as ad hoc networks. However, because of their limited
computation power, nodes in ad hoc networks cannot afford the costly computation
2In fact, as shown in the example in Section 3.1.1, it is not the virtual node representing the region but
all the real nodes in this region that determine the secret sharing configuration during the initialization
of the region, because the virtual node is logical and thus cannot take any operation by itself.
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involved in the proactive scheme. To reduce the cost to a tolerable level, we keep the
threshold of a region unchanged during its lifetime. It can greatly improve the efficiency
of the proactive scheme, since the cost of changing the configuration of a secret sharing
scheme from (n, k) to (n′, k′) [97,98] is very high, compared to the “Join” and “Leave”
operations in AKM (described in Section 3.2.2.1 and Section3.2.2.2, respectively).
3.2.1 Regular Periodic Renewal of Secret Shares
In AKM, a proactive threshold cryptography scheme is used to enable nodes in a region
to compute new shares from old ones in collaboration without disclosing the secret key
of the region. It relies on the homomorphic property.
It is unnecessary to require all the nodes involved in the share refreshing process.
Instead, the task can be done by only k nodes, since we assume that, between any
consecutive secret share updates, the number of adversaries who hold secret shares
originated from the same secret key is less than k. To detect those incorrect subshares,
the VSS scheme [99] is employed.
Details are shown as follows. To renew the secret shares of all the n nodes in a region,
firstly, k nodes are chosen from this region. Without lose of generality, we denote them
as (1, · · · , k). Each of the k nodes, denoted as node i, randomly generates an (n, k)
sharing of 0, denoted as (SKi1, SKi2, · · · , SKin), and then distributes the corresponding
subshare SKij to node j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. After receiving all the subshares generated by
the k nodes, each node in the region, denoted as node j, can compute a new share from
them and its old share (SK ′j = SKj+
∑k
i=1 SKij). The new shares constitute a new (n,
k) sharing of the service secret key. After refreshing, nodes remove the old shares and
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use the new ones to generate partial signatures. Because the new shares are independent
of the old ones, the adversary cannot combine old shares with new shares to recover the
secret key of the service. Thus, the adversary is challenged to compromise k nodes in
the same region between periodic refreshing.
3.2.2 Common Node-based and Region-based Operations
A comprehensive key management scheme must handle adjustments to secret shares
subsequent to all membership-changing operations in the underlying communication
system.
3.2.2.1 The “Join” operation
“Join” operations happen when one real node joins a region. It is, in fact, the process of
changing a region’s configuration from a threshold scheme of (n, k) to (n+1, k). Given
that node i joins a region, it first chooses a group of k nodes in this region denoted as
group G = {1, · · · , k}, and sends its request to them. Once node j receives the request,
it checks node i’s certificate and its CRL. If node j decides to serve the request, it
calculates a partial share for node i as:
SK ′j = SKj lj(i) + ∆j (mod q),






shuﬄing factor is imported to prevent SKj from being disclosed, because node i can
easily recover SKj from SK
′
j if there is no shuﬄing factor. One method to generate the
shuﬄing factor requires that each pair of nodes (j, r) in G exchanges a number Sjr, and
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σ(j − r) · Sjr,




1 x > 0
−1 x < 0
0 otherwise
Then node j returns the partial share to node i. After receiving k partial shares,









∆j = SKi (mod q)






3.2.2.2 The “Leave” operation
It happens when one node quits a region. Compared to the “Join” operation, this
operation is easier. When nodes receive a “Leave” request from a node in the same
region or detect that a node has left the region, they simply remove the certificate of that
node from their key management records without recomputing secret shares. However,
ORS does not decrease and thus RTC remains unchanged when a node “leaves” the
region, because the node may still possess a secret share of the secret key of this region.
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3.2.2.3 The “Merge” operation
“Merge” operations happen when the number of nodes within a region drops under its
threshold. Given that the threshold remains unchanged, the RTC of a region drops very
quickly if its ORS increases a lot. Therefore, we do not merge a region directly into a
nearby region with the least size or the highest RTC. Instead, region i is divided into a
few parts and each part is combined into one nearby region. Since the thresholds of the

















Cj1 Cjn Cr1 Crn
s + s' = n
Figure 3.3: The “Merge” operation
3.2.2.4 The “Partition” operation
“Partition” operations happen when the RTC of a region drops under GTC or is lower
than the security level expected. In AKM, the threshold of a region is fixed. Therefore,
if the ORS of a region increases greatly, adversaries have a large chance to compromise
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the threshold system. A straight-forward approach is to partition the region into two
regions with almost the same size. In the hierarchical key tree, new regions lie at the
same level as the original one. For example, as shown in Figure 3.4, region Bi with size
2n and the threshold k is partitioned into two regions Bi and Bm+1, each of which has
n nodes and keeps its threshold as k. For the n nodes remaining in region Bi, they just

















Figure 3.4: The “Partition” operation
In order to assign new secret shares to the n nodes in region Bm+1, firstly, region
Bm+1 chooses k regions at level 2, and then selects k nodes from each of the k regions.
Without lost of generality, we denote the group of the k regions , the group of the
k nodes from region Bj (j = 1, · · · , k), and the group of all these k2 nodes as GB =
{B1, · · · , Bk}, Gj = {Cj1, · · · , Cjk}, and G = {C11, · · · , C1k, · · · , Ck1, · · · , Ckk},
respectively. Then, a “Partition” request signed by the secret key of region Bi is gener-
ated and multicasted to all the nodes in group G. The IDs of region Bi, Bm+1, and the
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SKBj lBj (IDBi) (mod q) (3.1)




































From Eq. (3.3) and Eq. (3.4), we get:







where Rj = lBj (IDBm+1)− lBj (IDBi).
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Consequently, to help nodes in region Bm+1 generate the new shares of SKBm+1 , each
node Cjh in group G first computes SK
′
Cjh
= SKCjh lCjh(0)Rj . Then distributes the
partial shares, i.e. the secret shares of SK ′Cjh , to nodes in region Bm+1 using distributed
VSS scheme proposed in [27]. According to Eq. (3.5), using the homomorphic property,
each node in region Bm+1 can compute its new share of SKBm+1 by adding k
2 partial
shares from members in group G to its original share of SKBi .
3.2.2.5 The “Expansion” Operation
Similar to “Partition” operations, “Expansion” Operations happen when the RTC of a
region drops under GTC or is lower than the security level expected. However, there
is a special case in which we must take “Expansion” Operations. More specifically,
when AKM has reached its capacity upper limit (namely, the RTCs of all the regions
in AKM are equal to GTC), to ensure that the RTC of any region should not be less
than GTC, we have to undertake a “Expansion” Operation, which increases the height
of the hierarchical key tree.
For example, as shown in Figure 3.5(a), before the “Expansion” operation, the height
of AKM is L. Now there is a new node that wants to join region C1, but the RTCs of all
the regions in AKM including region C1 are equal to GTC. Therefore, the “Expansion”
operation is executed. We assume that, original secret sharing of region C1 is executed
by following Eq. (3.6).




















Figure 3.5: The “Expansion” operation
Firstly, chooses a group of m nodes from region C1 which will be degraded to Level
L + 1, where k ≤ m ≤ n − k + 1. Without loss of generality, let the group be R =
{D1, · · · ,Dk}. Following that, chooses a new identity denoted as IDDn+1 for the master
node of all the nodes degraded. According to the Shamir secret sharing scheme [30],
the secret share for node Dn+1 can be calculated by the k nodes in group R. However,
during the “Expansion” operation, this secret share would never be calculated out or
recovered explicitly, since we do not assume the existence of a TA at this stage.
For simplicity, the same (n, k) threshold scheme is employed in the newly created
region Dn+1. Without loss of generality, we assume that a new identity IDEi is assigned
to the node whose old identity is IDDi , or the identity is chosen by the node itself. Then
each node in group R calculates the following partial secret share denoted as SK ′Ei and
distributes it to the node with the new identity IDEi .
SK ′Ei = SKDj · lDn+1 +
k−1∑
r=1







. Finally, each node recovers its new secret share
in the new region by combining all the secret shares as Eq. (3.8).
SKEi = b0 + b1 · IDEi + · · · + bk−1 · IDk−1Ei (mod q), (3.8)
where b0 = SKDn+1 , br =
∑k
j=1 bjr (r = 1, 2, . . . , k − 1). Therefore, all the coefficients
of the secret sharing polynomial of the new region are cooperatively determined by the
k nodes. At the end of the operation, the height of AKM increases to L+ 1.
In Figure 3.5, there are n real nodes at level L before “Expansion”. After performing
the “Expansion” operation, m of them move to level L+ 1, while others still remain at
level L. From the security aspect, it means that those real nodes at level L have higher
privileges than those moving to level L + 1, since each of them holds a share of SKC1
directly. For nodes at level L+1, it requires k nodes of them to recover a share of SKC1
cooperatively. It may not be desirable in some circumstances.
In Figure 3.6, the “Expansion” operation groups previous n real nodes under C1 into
r regions, and the size of each region is denoted as Si (i = 1, 2, . . . , r). Therefore, we
have n =
∑i=r
i=1 Si. On one hand, the operation taken in Figure 3.6 can be viewed as
a series of operations (i.e. r operations) described in Figure 3.5, which are undertaken
separately for the r regions. On the other hand, the operation in Figure 3.5 can also
be viewed as a special case of the operation described in Figure 3.6, in which r − 1
of r regions has only one member, and this member remains its old share instead of
computing a new one.




















Figure 3.6: Generic “Expansion” operation
erations, they may take their (relative) physical locations into consideration as well. In
other words, they may prefer neighbors nearby to those nodes that are far away, when
region-based operations, e.g. “Partition” and “Expansion” operations, are executed.
3.2.2.6 The “Contraction” Operation
“Contraction” Operations happen when AKM reaches its capacity lower limit. To ensure
that the number of nodes in any region in AKM is not less than the threshold set
before, we have to decrease the level of the structure. Similar to a “Merge” operation,
a “Contraction” Operation can be viewed as a series of “Join” operations as well.
3.3 Certification Services Against Active Attacks
We described the architecture-level solution for key management in Section 3.1. In this
section, we elaborate on our solution by presenting two new algorithms that are designed
to protect certification services from active attacks.
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3.3.1 Certificate Initialization and Renewal
There are two ways to issue a new certificate or renew a certificate. A node may be
issued an initial certificate by an online or oﬄine TA, after the authority verifies the
principal’s authenticity through external means (e.g., in-person ID). However, it is both
costly for the TA to maintain certificates of all the nodes and is inconvenient for new
nodes to request their certificates from the root TA. An alternative approach is to
use any coalition of k networking nodes to issue an initial certificate via collaborative
admission control for this new node. In AKM, we use the second approach, and extend
it to support certification services with different levels of assurance. A certificate with
the lowest level of assurance is assigned with the cooperation of k real nodes within the
same region, while a certificate with higher-level assurance can be achieved with the
coalition of more nodes from different regions.
In AKM, the certificate of node i, denoted as CERTi, is a statement certi that is
signed by the secret key of its master node. The statement certi consists of the associa-
tion between node i and its public key, the ORS and the threshold of the master node,
and the expiration time. The ORS and the threshold are included in certi, since receivers
may be interested in these values and thus calculate the RTC of the region to which
node i belongs. For example, they are useful in performing region-based operations.
In [1–3], Kong et al. employ the RSA scheme [52] to provide certification services.
It works well under the flat structure. However, we find that it is not suitable for a
hierarchical structure like AKM. In RSA [52], the certificate of node i is denoted as
CERTi = (certi)
SK (mod N), where SK is the secret key of the master node of node i.
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According to the requirements of RSA, SK should be coprime to φ(N), i.e. the Euler
function of N . Namely,
gcd(SK, φ(N)) = 1 (3.9)
In AKM, all the secret keys of virtual nodes are generated during the recursive secret
sharing process. In addition, in a purely ad hoc network, each node has the right to
choose its ID instead of being predetermined by any entity. That is to say, during the
secret sharing process, the secret shares are generated with arbitrary IDs based on the
Shamir secret sharing scheme. Therefore, there is a high probability that they will not
be coprime to φ(N), which ≡ 0 (mod 4).
To handle such problems, we designed a scheme based on the difficulty of DLP [53].
Both ElGamal [100] and the Digital Signature Standard (DSS) [101] require the compu-
tation of the inverse of the secrets, and such an operation is costly. To be more efficient,
variants of the Schnorr signature scheme [102] and the signature scheme proposed by
Park and Kurosawa [103] are used. Here we only show two algorithms based on the
Schnorr signature scheme. In the former, node i selects a group of 2k − 1 nodes, and
these nodes cooperate to assign node i a certificate. It requires only one round to assign
a certificate. In the latter, node i selects a group of k nodes, and these nodes cooperate
to assign node i a certificate. It may need more than one round to assign a certificate
when there are malicious nodes launching active attacks.
The first algorithm was proposed by Stinson and Strobl [99], which is provably secure.
The second algorithm is modified from [99] by us, which is also provably secure. It is
very efficient but not fault-tolerant. These two algorithms, especially the second one,
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are more efficient and secure than the scheme proposed by Kong et al. [1–3]. Firstly,
both the algorithms proposed by Kong et al. cannot handle active attacks. They can
only verify whether the combined certificate is valid, but fails to detect invalid partial
certificates. Consequently, as long as there is one fake partial certificate among the k
partial certificates chosen to generate the certificate, all the work done by honest nodes
is useless. Even worse, adversaries can perform the attack without being caught. It
makes the scheme proposed by Kong et al. inefficient for ad hoc networks. To prevent
such attack, in our scheme nodes can verify each partial certificate to detect those
malicious nodes. Secondly, our algorithms are based on DLP [53], which is faster than
RSA [52] on which the algorithms proposed by Kong et al. are based. Thirdly, the
time for generating a partial certificate in our algorithms is 7 to 150 times shorter than
in the scheme proposed by Kong et al., when there is no communication error. Such
advantage is critical in ad hoc networks where by nature the less help a node requests
from its neighbors, the higher is the chance of obtaining the help. Furthermore, the
algorithm proposed by Kong et al. requires a k-bounded offsetting to recover the real
certificate [1–3], while we can generate the real certificate directly.
3.3.1.1 Assigning certificates based on 2k − 1 nodes
In this algorithm, a VSS scheme is employed to find out adversaries who launch active
attacks. Since Pedersen’s VSS scheme [27] requires a dealer, it is not suitable for ad hoc
environments. Instead, we follow the distributed way proposed in Stinson’s scheme [99]
to achieve verifiable secure sharing. This algorithm requires cooperation from 2k − 1
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nodes3, and it ensures that the whole process of assigning a certificate can be finished
within one round, in spite of active attacks launched by malicious nodes, since there are
at most k − 1 adversaries.
Let p and q be two large primes such that q divides p− 1, and let Gq be the unique
multiplicative subgroup of Zp with order q. Let m be the statement claiming that a new
node i’s public key is PKi, let h(·) be a one-way hash function: {0, 1}∗ → Zq.
Firstly, node i chooses a group of 2k − 1 nodes from its neighbors. Without loss
of generality, let the group be G = {ID1, · · · , ID2k−1}. Then node i broadcasts the
request m together with the IDs of the 2k − 1 nodes among the group G. To achieve
VSS, we need to generate a random shared secret denoted as r within group G. Details
is shown as follows.
Once a node j ∈ G receives the request and decides to serve the request, it chooses
rj , r
′
j ∈ Zq at random, and verifiably shares them among G acting as the dealer according
to Pedersen’s VSS scheme. Let the sharing polynomials be fj(u) =
∑k−1
t=0 ajtu













jt (mod p) for t ∈ {0, · · · , k − 1}, where g and h are two generators of Gq and no one
knows logg h. Let H0 be the set of nodes which are not detected to be cheating. Then
the shared secret r is defined as r =
∑
j∈H0









f ′t(IDj) (mod q).
Next, each node j (∈ H0) broadcasts Ajk = gajt for t ∈ {0, · · · , k − 1}, and each
3On consideration of the dynamic property of ad hoc networks, a relative higher number of nodes
may need to be involved in this algorithm.
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IDts (mod p) (3.10)
If the check fails for an index j, node s complains against node j by broadcasting
the values fj(IDs), f
′
j(IDs) that satisfy







but do not satisfy Equation (3.10). For node i which received at least one valid com-
plaint, other nodes run the reconstruction phase of Pedersen’s VSS scheme to compute
rj , fj(·), Ajt for t = 0, · · · , k − 1. Therefore, all the players in H0 set Xj = grj .









ajt, for t ∈ 1, · · · , k − 1, and f(j) = ej (mod q) for j ∈ H0.
Ct = g
at (t = 0, · · · , k − 1)
In [96], the above scheme is proved to be robust under the assumption that k ≤ n2 .
In AKM, this assumption is satisfied, since the threshold of a region is normally set to
be much less than the number of nodes in this region.
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Then for each node j ∈ H0, reveals its partial certificate:
γj = ej + h(m||X) · SKj (mod q),
and γj can be verified by:






for all j ∈ H0.
Let (SK, PK) denote the key pair of the region to which the 2k−1 nodes belong. Let
H1 denote the set of nodes not detected to be cheating in the above step. After verifying
the partial certificates, node i selects an arbitrary subset H2 ⊆ H1 with |H2| = k.












(mod q). Then node i’s signature for m (i.e. CERTi)
is the pair (X, σ). Since σ = e + h(m||X)SK (mod q), other nodes can verify the
certificate by:
gσ = X · PKh(m||X) (mod p)
3.3.1.2 Assigning certificates based on k nodes
Although the algorithm presented Section 3.3.1.1 can complete the certification service
within one round, both the computation and communication overheads for achieving
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VSS are heavy for nodes in ad hoc networks. The complexities of the computation and
communication cost of VSS are O(k) and O(k2), respectively. It is mainly due to the
costly commitment process. To solve this problem, in this section we present another
algorithm which requires lightweight computation. This algorithm needs cooperation
from only k nodes, but it may take more than one round to assign a certificate, when
malicious nodes are launching active attacks. Although this algorithm is not fault-
tolerant, we can distinguish honest and malicious nodes, and those honest nodes are
selected directly as members of group G of the next round. The complexities of both
the computation and communication cost of one round of our second algorithm areO(1).
Simulation results show that, when there is no communication error, more than 96% of
certification renewals can be finished within two rounds, even if malicious nodes launch
active attacks. It is much higher than that of the scheme proposed by Kong et al. [1–3],
which declines very fast when the threshold increases.
Let p and q be two large primes such that q divides p − 1, let Gq be the unique
multiplicative subgroup of Zp with order q, and let g be a generator of Gq. Let m be the
statement claiming that a new node i’s public key is PKi, let h(·) be a one-way hash
function: {0, 1}∗ → Zq.
Details of the algorithm for generating a threshold Schnorr signature are shown as
follows. Firstly, node i chooses a group of k nodes from its neighbors. Without loss of
generality, let the group be G = {ID1, · · · , IDk}. Then node i broadcasts the request
m together with the IDs of the k nodes in group G.
Once a node j ∈ G receives the request and decides to serve the request, it first
chooses a random integer ej ∈ Zq and broadcasts xj = gej (mod p) and PKj =
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gSKj (mod p) within the group G. Then node j calculates its partial certificate γj
that is specific to group G






(mod q) and X =
∏k
j=1 xj (mod p), and returns it
to node i. Node i can verify the partial certificate as follow:
gγj = xj · PKh(m||X)lj(0)j (mod p) (3.12)
If the k partial certificates are valid, node i calculates σ =
∑k
j=1 γj , and its signature
for m (i.e. CERTi) is the pair (X, σ). Other nodes and node i can verify the certificate
by:
gσ = X · PKh(m||X) (mod p) (3.13)
where the public key of the region to which k nodes belong is denoted as PK. In
practice, node i can first verify (X, σ) using Equation (3.13). If it is valid, the task is
completed. Otherwise, node i then verifies the partial certificates using Equation (3.12).
3.3.1.3 Assigning certificates with higher level assurance
In AKM, all the secret shares originate from the same global secret key. Making use
of this property, our scheme can provide the ability to assign certificates with different
levels of assurance at relatively small costs. Section 3.3.1.1 and Section 3.3.1.2 present
how to assign a certificate with the lowest level assurance. Both of the two algorithms
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can be extended to assign certificates with higher-level assurance, but here we just
discuss the latter with an example of assigning a certificate with 2-level assurance.
As shown in Figure 3.7, the secret key of a virtual node A (i.e. SKA) is distributed
to n virtual nodes {B1, B2, · · · , Bn} using an (n, k) threshold scheme, and again SKBj
(j = 1, 2, · · · , n) is distributed to nj real nodes {Cj1, Cj2, · · · , Cjnj} with an (nj , kj)
threshold scheme. For simplicity, we assume that nj = n and kj = k, for all j =
1, 2, · · · , n.
BjB1 Bn
A
C1hC11 C1n CjhCj1 Cjn CnhCn1 Cnn
Figure 3.7: An example of assigning a certificate with 2-level assurance
Node i which wants to get a certificate with 2-level assurance first needs to choose
k regions, and then choose k real nodes from each of these k regions.
Without losing of generality, let the group of k2 nodes beG= {C11, · · · , Cjh, · · · , Ckk},
which belong to k regions {B1, B2, · · · , Bk}. Then node i broadcasts the request m to-
gether with the node IDs of the k2 real nodes and k regions among the group G.
Once the request is received, real node Cjh which decides to serve the request from
node i first chooses a random integer ejh ∈ Zq and broadcasts xjh = gejh and PKjh =
gSKjh within the group G. Then node Cjh calculates its additive share γjh that is specific
to group G

















(mod q), and returns it to node i. Node i can verify the partial
certificate as follow:
gγjh = xjh · (PKjh)h(m||X)ljh(0)λj (0) (mod p) (3.14)





its signature for m (i.e. CERTi) is (X, σ). Other nodes and node i can verify the
certificate by:
gσ = X · (PKA)h(m||X) (mod p). (3.15)
In this scheme, to obtain a certificate with b level assurance, node i needs the coop-
eration of at most kb honest nodes. Such requirement is reasonable and this scheme is
efficient, since in AKM kb is much smaller than the size of the whole ad hoc network,
i.e. nb. Again, in practice, node i can first verify (X, σ) using Equation (3.15). If it
is valid, the task is completed. Otherwise, node i then verifies the partial certificates
using Equation (3.14).
3.3.2 Certificate Revocation
In AKM, the CRL is based on the accusations from other nodes. In a multi-hop wireless
network like ad hoc network, the reliability of an accusation is based on the security of
all the nodes that pass and broadcast the accusation. As such, the further an accusation
comes from, the higher the probability that this accusation is compromised or malicious
is. As a result, in ad hoc networks, messages from far away are not as trustworthy as
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those generated by neighbors (nodes or regions). In addition, large accusation range
results in rapidly increased communication and storage overheads. Therefore, the range
of the accusations is limited to the same region. If node i receives an accusation on
node j, it marks node j as “suspect” when there are less than k accusations towards it.
Otherwise, node j is marked as “compromised” and is added into node i’s CRL. In addi-
tion, node i launches a request to the k nodes which accused node j to sign a certificate
revocation message. For example, in Figure 3.2, a (3, 2) threshold system is employed
within region T , and node E and F accuse on node D. Thus, they can cooperate to
generate and send out a message signed by SKT to revoke node D’s certificate.
3.4 Simulations on Security and Efficiency
In highly dynamic environment like ad hoc networks, small region size may result in rapid
variances of the structure of the key tree. On the other hand, if the size is too large, we
may have problems in intra-region routing. Current on-demand routing protocols, such
as AODV [73, 74] and OLSR [104], handle well when the size of the ad hoc network is
around 100 to 250 nodes. Thus, it is suitable to set the region size within this range.
Let pn be the probability of a node being compromised, pr be the probability of a region
being compromised, and n be the size of the region. Table 3.3 shows the settings on the
threshold of a region under different conditions. From the table, we find that, when pn
is not less than 0.01, to ensure pr lower than 10
−4, the threshold of a region should be
set to at least 7 and 11 for a region with 100 and 250 nodes, respectively.
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Table 3.3: Settings on the threshold of a region
pn n = 100 n=250
pr < 10
−4 pr < 10
−5 pr < 10
−4 pr < 10
−5
0.01 7 8 11 13
0.05 16 17 28 30
0.1 24 26 45 48
3.4.1 Hierarchical Structure vs. Flat Structure
To show advantages of the hierarchical structure over the flat structure in key man-
agement based on threshold cryptography, we compare the probabilities of GSK being
compromised in AKM and [1–3]. In our implementation, a 3-level structure is employed,
and the threshold of any region in AKM is set to be 10. As shown in Figure 3.8, under
the flat structure, the security of an ad hoc network is very weak when the size of the
whole network increases. However, under the hierarchical structure, the probability of































Probability of GSK being Compromised −− Pn=0.01, h=2
flat structure
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Figure 3.8: Flat structure vs. hierarchical
structure






































Figure 3.9: Pr with fixed RTC
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3.4.2 Regions with the Same RTC
As shown in Figure 3.9, the higher the RTC is, the smaller pr is. Therefore, it is suitable
to use RTC as an approximate index of the security condition of a region. In addition,
the higher the RTC is, the faster pr decreases. Due to these two properties, a higher
RTC is good for the sake of security. However, on the other hand, it results in a higher
threshold which requires more computation power.
In addition, we find that, when both the RTC and the region size are small, this
region is easy to be compromised. For example, in Figure 3.9, given that the pn is 0.01
and the RTC of a region is 0.05, pr may be higher than 0.01 when the size of the region
is less than 75. Consequently, we need to be aware of this during the generation of
a region. In other words, when the number of initial nodes in a region is small, the
threshold should be set to a relative high value.
3.4.3 Computational Costs of Region-based Operations
Table 3.4: Computation cost of “Partition” and “Expansion” operations
ORS Threshold “Partition” Operation (msec) “Expansion” Operation (msec)
GPSS GNSS Total GPSS GNSS Total
100 5 8.87 0.03 8.90 1.59 0.01 1.60
100 10 18.59 0.11 18.70 4.52 0.02 4.54
100 15 30.96 0.28 31.24 7.91 0.02 7.93
100 20 46.24 0.60 46.84 11.69 0.02 11.71
100 25 62.00 0.80 62.80 16.42 0.03 16.45
250 10 47.63 0.11 47.74 11.00 0.03 11.03
250 20 124.20 0.68 124.88 27.67 0.03 27.70
250 30 205.27 1.29 206.56 54.71 0.07 54.78
250 40 302.27 2.24 304.51 90.16 0.07 90.23
250 50 422.73 3.77 426.50 135.78 0.07 135.85
Since both “Merge” and “Contraction” operations can be viewed as a series of “Join”
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operations, our simulation focuses on “Partition” and “Expansion” operations. We run
the simulation on a Pentium III 800 laptop.
Table 3.4 shows the computation cost of “Partition” and “Expansion” operations
under different ORS and threshold. In the table, GPSS stands for time for generating
partial secret shares for all the nodes in the newly generated region, while GNSS stands
for time for generating the new secret share. Simulation results show that the computa-
tion cost of both “Partition” and “Expansion” operations is quite small under common
threshold and region size settings. For example, when the ORS of a region is 100 and
its threshold is 15, it only takes 31 milliseconds to complete the “Partition” operation.
As to the “Expansion” operation, the whole cost is less than 8 milliseconds.
3.4.4 Computational Costs of Certification Services
We measure and compare the performance of the algorithm proposed by Kong et al. [1–
3] and our second algorithm on a Pentium III 800 laptop. Both of algorithms are
implemented in Java. We run the experiments under different settings, e.g. different
key lengths, thresholds, and region sizes. For each setting, we run the two algorithms
for 20 times respectively and then calculate the average values.
Here, the time for generating or renewing a certificate is calculated as the sum of all
the processes taken by nodes, including the requesting node and those neighbors that
provide certification services, as described in the algorithms. The main objective of this
simulation is to show that compared to the algorithm proposed by Kong et al. [1–3] our
second algorithm has much looser requirements on the computational power of nodes.
Moreover, both Kong et al.’s algorithm and our second algorithm require help from
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k nodes, and have similar communication costs. Therefore, we do not consider the
communication overhead, when comparing the two algorithms.
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Figure 3.10: Total time for generating or renewing a certificate in our second algorithm
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(b) n = 250
Figure 3.11: Time for generating a partial certificate in our second algorithm
As shown in Figure 3.10, the total time for generating or renewing a certificate in
our second algorithm varies from 20 to 250 milliseconds in the experiments, depending
on the setting on the key length, threshold, and region size. In particular, when the
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key length is 1024 bits, it takes our second algorithm around 40 to 70 milliseconds to
generate or renew a certificate. We also find that, in our second algorithm, the process
that a neighbor generates a partial certificate for the new node is very fast. As shown
in Figure 3.11, such process takes less than 32 milliseconds under all the settings tested
in the experiments. In particular, when the key length is 1024 bits, it takes less than 9
milliseconds to generate a partial certificate.
To compare with previous work [1–3], in Figure 3.12 and Figure 3.13, we show the
ratio of the total time for generating or renewing a certificate in the algorithm proposed
by Kong et al. [1–3] (denoted as TC−KONG) to that of our second algorithm (denoted
as TC−OUR) and the ratio of the time for generating a partial certificate in the algo-
rithm proposed by Kong et al. (denoted as TPC−KONG) to that of our second algorithm
(denoted as TPC−OUR), respectively. As shown in Figure 3.12, our second algorithm
is more efficient, when we consider the total time for assigning a new certificate. For
instance, when the key length is 1024 bits, our second algorithm is around six to eight
times faster than the algorithm proposed by Kong et al. As to the process of gener-
ating a partial certificate, the efficiency is greatly improved in our second algorithm.
For example, when the key length is 1024 bits, our second algorithm is around 20 to 80
times faster. Consequently, using our second algorithm, a node can easily find enough
neighbor nodes to provide the certification service, since very little effort is involved.
From empirical results, we notice that the performance of our algorithm is tightly
related to the key length and the threshold. The larger the key length is, the more
time we need to complete the certification service. However, compared to the scheme
proposed by Kong et al. [1–3], our second scheme is less sensitive to this parameter, and
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thus is more efficient. Similarly, the larger the threshold is, the more time we need to
complete the certification service.
















































n =100. k = 5
n =100. k = 10
n =100. k = 15
n =100. k = 20
n =100. k = 25
n =250. k = 10
n =250. k = 20
n =250. k = 30
n =250. k = 40
n =250. k = 50
Figure 3.12: Ratio of TC−KONG to TC−OUR
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Figure 3.13: Ratio of TPC−KONG to
TPC−OUR
3.4.5 Certification Services Under Active Attacks
To compare the efficiency of certification services under active attacks, we use the success
rate of certification renewals within certain rounds and the average rounds of retries
before successfully assigning or renewing a certificate as the evaluation metrics. Here,
we denote the success rate of certification renewals within r rounds and the wireless
channel error rate as SRr and e, respectively.
We run the simulation in a 600m X 600m network with 100 or 250 nodes, and the
speed of nodes ranges from 1 m/s to 20 m/s. The random way-point model is applied to
emulate node mobility pattern. In the simulation, we consider the scenarios of different
wireless channel error rates, from no error (0%) to high error rate (10%). For each
scenario, if the certification renewal fails due to either active attacks or communication
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errors, the node which requests the certification service would replay the request up to
a maximum number of retries. Typically, we set the maximum number of retries to 100
in the simulation.
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(a) error rate = 0%
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(d) error rate = 10%
Figure 3.14: Success rate of certification renewals – n = 100
As shown in Figure 3.14 and Figure 3.154, in all the simulation models, the success
rate of the algorithm proposed by Kong et al. [1–3] declines very quickly when the
4Note that, due to limited space in Figure 3.14, Figure 3.15, and Figure 3.16, we denote the algorithm
proposed by Kong et al. [1–3] as a short term “Kong Alg.” in these three figures. However, it does not
mean that the algorithm is designed by Kong only.
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(d) error rate = 10%
Figure 3.15: Success rate of certification renewals – n = 250
threshold increases. For example, even when there is no communication error, for a
region with size 100 and pn is 0.01, if the threshold of this region is set to be 5, SR2
is 81.7%. However, if the threshold increases to 10, it drops to 38.2%. In contrast, in
our second algorithm, SR2 decreases only 0.2%, i.e. from 100% to 99.8%, while the
threshold increases from 5 to 10.
As shown in Figure 3.14 and Figure 3.15, the success rate of our second algorithm
is always higher than that of the algorithm proposed by Kong et al. [1–3]. However,
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we also notice that in our second algorithm, the higher the wireless channel error rate
is, the faster the success rate of certification renewals declines. More specifically, our
second algorithm works well under low wireless channel error rates, e.g. e = 1%. When
e increases (e.g. under heavy communications), SRr is more sensitive to the variations
on the threshold. For instance, as shown in Figure 3.14, when e = 1% and n = 100,
SR2 decrease by 5.4%, while the threshold increases 5 from 10. However, when e = 10%
and n = 100, for the same variation of the threshold, SR2 decreases by 33.4% instead.
In such cases, to improve the success rate, we need to either choose a small threshold or
increase the number of retries. The former is more effective. In addition, in AKM, to
ensure the security, the RTC of one region should not be less than GTC. Therefore, we
need to limit the size of a region, when the wireless channel error rate is high.
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Figure 3.16: Average retries of certification renewals
Figure 3.16 shows the average retries of certification renewals in the algorithm
proposed by Kong et al. [1–3] and our second algorithm under different wireless channel
error rates. In all the cases, compared to our second algorithm, the algorithm proposed
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by Kong et al. takes more rounds to complete the certification renewal. Similar to
the experimental results on the success rate of certification renewals, in our second
algorithm, the higher the wireless channel error rate is, the faster the average retries of
certification renewals raises when the threshold of the region increases.
3.4.6 Summary
The empirical results on our architecture level solution (i.e. AKM) show that, on one
hand, the hierarchical structure of AKM makes it more scalable compared to the flat
structure schemes [1–3]. On the other hand, the computation cost of the two most
expensive region-based operations, i.e. “Partition” and “Expansion”, are quite small
under common threshold and region size settings. In other words, simulation results
indicate that AKM is more scalable and efficient compared to previous work.
As to our algorithm level solution, especially the second algorithm for certification
services, simulation results show that our second algorithm is more efficient under both
hostile and good environments.
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CHAPTER 4
EASE: The Efficient Anonymity
and Security-Enabled Routing
Protocol
Anonymity is an indispensable part of the comprehensive solution of ad hoc network
security, and under certain privacy-vital environments it is a fundamental requirement.
For example, in a battle field, we not only want to ensure that adversaries cannot disclose
the content of our communications (i.e., confidentiality) or disable the communications
(i.e., availability and integrity), but also expect that the identities and location informa-
tion of parties in communications are anonymous to adversaries. Otherwise, adversaries
may deduce important information about the location or mobility model of communi-
cation parties, which can be used to locate the target of their physical attacks at a later
time.
4.1 Design Goals
We intend to design a routing protocol which can protect the privacy of nodes and
routes, and at the same time ensure other properties, such as security and efficiency.





Identity anonymity consists of the following requirements: (a) No one knows the real
identities of the source and the destination, except themselves; (b) The source and the
destination have no information about the real identities of intermediate nodes en route.
4.1.1.2 Location Privacy
Location privacy consists of the following requirements: (a) No one knows the exact
location of the source or the destination, except themselves; (b) Other nodes, including
both those nodes outside the route discovered and the intermediate nodes en route, have
no information about their distance, i.e. the number of hops, from either the source or
the destination. This requirement is optional, but it is desirable in keeping both identity
and location anonymity of the source or the destination, especially when the distance is
just one hop.
For a protocol satisfying (a), we say that such a protocol provides weak location
privacy ; for a protocol satisfying both (a) and (b), we say that such a protocol provides
strong location privacy.
4.1.1.3 Route Anonymity
Route anonymity consists of the following requirements: (a) Adversaries, either en route
or outside the route, cannot trace a packet flow back to its source or destination; (b)
For adversaries not in the route, they have no information on any part of the route; (c)
It is difficult for adversaries to infer the transmission pattern and motion pattern of the
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source or the destination;
4.1.2 Ensure Security
The protocol should ensure that the discovered route could function properly (namely,
the protocol can find the route correctly and efficiently) under different attacks.
4.1.3 Ensure Efficiency
The protocol should be efficient in the sense of both computation and communication
costs. More specifically, we expect that less cryptographic operations (especially asym-
metric encryption/decryption operations) are involved during the route discovery pro-
cess, and both the route discovery and the route maintenance processes do not generate
a large number of messages.
4.2 Assumptions
In this paper, we assume that (1) there is a shared secret between the source and the
destination; (2) wireless links are symmetric. Namely, if node A is in transmission
range of some node B, then B is in transmission range of A as well; (3) Each node can
change the source address of its outgoing Medium Access Control (MAC) frames, so
that adversaries cannot trace the node based on its unique MAC address; (4) adversaries
have unbounded eavesdropping capability but bounded computing and node intrusion
capabilities.
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4.3 Design of EASE
The design of EASE is mainly based on two ideas. The first one is to make use of the
shared secret between the two communication parties and generate the variable part of
the route request/reply in a way similar to the encryption of data with one-time key
pad. Thus, adversaries without the secret cannot deduce meaningful information by
sniffing. Moreover, we employ XOR and rotation operations to ensure that the length
of the variable part is unchanged, and thus frustrate adversaries’ attempt on finding
patterns of variations on the route discovery packets, a common type of attacks against
previous anonymous routing protocols for ad hoc networks. The other idea is to make
use of the shared secrets between consecutive pairs of nodes en route, which are setup
during the route discovery process, to provide a local repair mechanism. Since most
of communication costs of anonymous routing protocols result from the flooding route
request process, the local repairing mechanism is expected to improve the efficiency of
anonymous routing protocols.
The EASE protocol consists of the following parts: Route Request, Route Reply,
Data Transmission, and Route Maintenance. The notions of different types of packets
involved in the route discovery process are shown in Table 4.1.
RREQ Route Request Packet RREP Route Reply Packet
RERR Route Error Packet RRPR Route Repair Packet
RUPD Route Update Packet
Table 4.1: Notions of types of packets involved in route discovery
As showed in Figure 4.1, we denote the source node, nodes en route, and the des-
tination node as S, Xi (i = 1, 2, . . . , n), and D, respectively. n denotes the number of
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nodes between the source and the destination.
S X 1 Xi Xn D
Figure 4.1: The route from source S to destination D
4.3.1 Route Request
During the route request process, each node en route denoted as Xi (i = 1, 2, . . . , n)
receives a route request with the following format:
[RREQ, seq, KT (dest, Ks, Uorig), Ks(seq, END), PKi−1, Ui−1],
where
seq — the sequence number of each session.
KT — the secret shared between the source and destination.
dest — the identity of the destination D.
Ks — a session key of current session.
END — a sign showing that the destination has received the route request.
PKi−1 — the public key of the one-time key pair generated by the previous node
Xi−1. PK0 is the one-time public key chosen by the source S.
Uorig — a random number chosen by the source S.
Ui−1 — a number generated by Xi−1 (i = 1, 2, · · · , n). For i = 1, U0 is generated
by the source S.
For Ui (i = 1, 2, · · · , n) in RREQ, Xi computes it according to Equation (4.1):
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Ui = f(Ui−1, Si) = (Ui−1 ⊕ Si) px, (4.1)
where Si is a random number chosen by Xi with size px. When i = 0, U0 is calculated
by the source S according to Equation 4.2:
U0 = f(Uorig, S0) = (Uorig ⊕ S0) px, (4.2)
Uorig and S0 are random numbers chosen by the source S with size ps and px, respectively.
Note that, in Equation (4.1) and Equation (4.2), ⊕ means the operation that Si, the
length of which is px, XORs with the least px bits of Ui−1. Thus, the computation
denoted by Equation (4.1) and Equation (4.2) includes two steps. The output of the
first step is a number with size ps. The least px bits of the output is the result that Si
XORs with the least px bits of Ui−1 or Uorig, while the higher bits are the same as the
corresponding bits of Ui−1 or Uorig. The next step is to right shift the result of the first
step for px bits.
Let Hmax denote the maximum number of hops that S wish the route to be. Then,
we have:
ps = (Hmax + 1) · px (4.3)
For instance, given that the length of the random number chosen by Xi, i.e. Si,
is 16 bits, the source wants to discover a route between the destination and itself, and
expects the length of the route is no more than 10 hops (i.e. Hmax = 10). According
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to Equation (4.3), we know that px = 176, and thus generate a random number Uorig
with 176 bits during the generation of the route request packet. The setting of Hmax
is tightly related to the network density and mobility. Intuitively, the higher Hmax is,
the more routes will be found during the route discovery process. However, due to
the dynamic property of ad hoc networks, the routes might be broken after some time
period. Therefore, it may be inefficient to store a large number of routes, since most
of them are unusable at a later time. Obviously, there is a trade-off between the route
availability and the storage while choosing Hmax.
Once receiving the RREQ packet, each forwarding node denoted as Xi first checks
whether seq has been recorded in its RREQ buffer table. If yes, it simply discards the
packet without decrypting the third element of the RREQ packet. Otherwise, Xi tries
to decrypt KT (dest,Ks, Uorig).
If fails, Xi first adds a new record into the RREQ buffer table. The format of a
record in the RREQ buffer table of Xi is shown as follows:
[seq, PKi−1, Ks(seq,END)]
Then Xi generates Ui as shown in Equation (4.1), and replaces PKi−1 and Ui−1 with its
one-time public key (i.e. PKi) and Ui, respectively. Finally, Xi broadcasts the modified
packet locally.
If successful, it means that Xi is the destination node of this packet, since only the
destination can successfully decrypt the packet. Afterwards, D compares Uorig, which is
recovered from the third element of the RREQ packet, to Un (i.e. the sixth element of
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the RREQ packet). The destination discards those RREQ packets whose Un’s have been
modified by more thanHmax nodes. In other words, the destination ignores those routes,
the lengths of which are longer than the hop limit. For those routes with fewer hops, the
destination can figure out the exact distance from the source through the comparison.
Thereafter, depending on whether EASE provides the multiple-path functionality1, D
may send out a RREP packet for each route with less than Hmax hops or only for the
first route with less than Hmax hops, and at the same time adds a new record into its
local route table. To counterattack sniffing, unlike AODV [73,74], the destination needs
to forward RREQs received like intermediate nodes.
At the end of the route request process, each node en route has the one-time public
key of the previous node, and the destination has knowledge about the number of routes
found between S and D and the length of each route.
4.3.2 Route Reply
During the route reply process, each node en route denoted as Xi (i = 1, 2, . . . , n)










Ti+1 — a random number chosen by Xi+1, which is used as the shared secret
between Xi and Xi+1 after the routing discovery process.
1The empirical results and analysis on employing the multiple-path mechanism is given in Sec-
tion 4.5.2.
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K ′s — the proof that the destination has recovered the secret, i.e. the session
key Ks, from the third element of the RREQ packet.
TPK, TSK— the key pair generated for the current session.
Vi+1 — a number generated by Xi+1. For i = n, Vn+1 is generated by the
destination D.
Hroute — the number of hops that this RREP packet is supposed to be forwarded
before reaching the source.
Vorig — a random number chosen by the destination D.
For Vi (i = 1, 2, · · · , n) in RREP, Xi computes it according to Equation (4.4):
Vi = g(Vi+1, Ti) = (Vi+1 ⊕ Ti) qx (4.4)
where Ti+1 is a random number chosen by Xi+1 with size qx. When i = n+ 1, Vn+1 is
calculated by the destination D according to Equation (4.5):
Vn+1 = g(Vorig, Tn+1) = (Vorig ⊕ Tn+1) qx (4.5)
Vorig and Tn+1 are random numbers chosen by the destination D with size qd and qx,
respectively.
For the sake of anonymity, qd cannot be equal to Hroute · qx. Otherwise, adversaries
can easily obtain the information about the route length by sniffing the RREP packets.
Therefore, qd should be set a few qx bits longer than Hroute · qx. Namely, we have
qd > Hroute · qx
111
For example, if we assume that the Hroute of a given RREP packet is 7 and qx is set to
be 128 bits, we may set qd to be 1280 bits. Alternatively, we can set qd according to
Equation (4.6), in spite of what the exact length of the route is, although it might be
communicationally inefficient when the route length is much shorter than Hmax.
qd = (Hmax + 1) · qx (4.6)
Once receiving the RREP packet, each forwarding node denoted as Xi first tries to
decrypt {Ti+1}PKi , and recovers the last element of the RREP packet. Since the last
element is encrypted by Ti+1, only Xi can decrypt it. Then Xi extracts seq from the
recovered information, and checks whether seq has been recorded in its RREQ buffer
table. If no, it simply discards the packet without any furtherer checking. Otherwise, Xi
extracts K ′s from the recovered information. Thereafter, Xi also needs to make sure that
the RREP packet is from the destination. It can be verified by Equation (4.7), because
only the destination D can recover Ks from the RREQ packet. If Equation (4.7) is not




After successfully verifying the validity of the RREP packet, Xi chooses a random
number Ti with size qx, and computes Vi from Vi+1 and Ti according to Equation (4.4).
Following that, Xi builds a new record in its route table. Then computes {Ti}PKi−1
and Ti(seq,K
′
s, TPK, Vi, KT (Hroute, Vorig, TSK)), which are used to replace the last
two elements of the RREP packet received. Finally, Xi broadcasts the modified RREP
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packet locally.
Upon receiving the RREP packet, the source S can extract theHroute and the shared
secrets along the route from the packet (i.e. T1, T2, . . . , THroute), and then record them
into the local route table. In our scheme, instead of only recording the shared secret
with the first forwarding node, the source needs to record all the shared secrets from
itself to the destination. In Section 4.3.4, we present how this additional effort benefits
the route maintenance process. Since these secrets are generated randomly and are used
only for this specific route from S to D, the source cannot deduce the identities of those
forwarding nodes with the knowledge.
At the end of the route discovery process, each forwarding node has established
shared secrets with the previous and next nodes, and masters the public key for the
current session. As to the source and the destination, they have additional knowledge
on the number of routes found and their lengths together with the private key for the
current session. Moreover, only the source knows the shared secrets established along
the route.
4.3.3 Data Transmission
To realize anonymous data transmission, we need to make sure that adversaries are
not able to read or deduce information about the source and destination from data
packets, and such information is only open to entities holding corresponding secrets. It
is definitely not a good idea to encrypt the whole data packet using the shared secrets,
although this solution is workable in theory; otherwise, each node has to try to decrypt
the whole content of every packet received before deciding whether to accept it or not.
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Consequently, this method results in a huge amount of computational cost.
In EASE, we provide a solution by making use of the shared secrets between any two
consecutive nodes (i.e. Ti). Our idea is to construct some small-size information which
is sent together with the data packet so that a forwarding node only needs to verify a
small size information instead of the whole packet. It is similar to the construction of
route pseudonym in [22], but is more simple and efficient. The small size information
denoted as TAG is constructed as follows.
Given that, node Xi and node Xi+1 share a secret denoted as Ti+1. Let HK() be
a keyed fast one-way function, which uses K as the key. The format of TAG on the
packet from Xi to Xi+1, denoted as TAGi, is calculated as HTi+1(N), where N is a
non-decreasing number.
The data transmission process is similar to the route discovery process. Any for-
warding node broadcasts the data packet to its neighbors, and then neighbors verify
the validity of the TAG. If the packet passes the verification, the forwarding node re-
calculates and replaces the TAG. In addition, before broadcasting the packet to its
neighbors, the content of data packets should be shuﬄed by an efficient encryption so
that the adversaries cannot match payload contents to trace data forwarding. If the
packet fails to pass the verification, it is discarded. Such a process is repeated until the
packet reaches the destination.
One major challenge in anonymous data transmission is to ensure the route anonymity
when we assume that time synchronization is not available. And such an assumption is
reasonable for pure ad hoc networks where there is no central trusted party. In EASE,
the non-decreasing numbers held by two consecutive nodes are synchronized, because
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they are initialized to the same number when generating the new records in the local
route table during the route discovery process, and are increased per packet received or
sent in this route.
4.3.4 Route Maintenance
4.3.4.1 Motive of Providing The Local Repair Functionality
In ad hoc networks, we wish that the discovered anonymous route is robust and efficient
against failures due to the following reasons: (1) node mobility; (2) join/leave operations
of nodes; (3) nodes en route are hacked, and refuse to provide the data-forwarding func-
tion. A straightforward solution is to re-launch the route discovery process. However,
in most anonymous routing protocols, route requests are broadcasted to flood the whole
network, and thus it is costly to launch a new route discovery process. As such, this
method is inefficient under ad hoc networks in which the network is highly dynamic and
with poor physical protection, and we have to launch new route discovery process fre-
quently. Alternatively, we can try to store all the routes found during the route discovery
process. It is only workable under certain circumstances and has a few limitations. The
effectiveness and limitations of this method are to be discussed in detail in Section 4.5.2.
In [105], authors show that local repair has significant performance advantages in for
large networks with increasingly longer routes (e.g., 10 or more hops). Consequently,
it is desirable to have a method to repair the current route instead of launching a
new routing request. Unfortunately, due to the anonymity limitations, previous local
repair mechanisms, for traditional networks or even ad hoc networks with no anonymity
requirements, cannot be employed directly in the anonymous routing protocols for ad hoc
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networks. In our scheme, we make use of the shared secrets along the route found, which
are obtained during the previous route discovery process, to find a usable route with
less computation and communication overheads. At the same time, our scheme ensures
that the local repair process does not impair the anonymity property of the route. The
idea of designing the locally-repairing mechanism is based on two observations: (1)
The two communication parties, namely the source and destination, can have some
extra privileges over nodes en route, as long as such privileges do not compromise the
anonymity of other nodes; (2) Knowing the secret shares along the route does not help
the source deduce the identities of the forwarding nodes en route, because shared secrets
used by any part of the route are totally randomly chosen and are used only for this
specific route from S to D. Similarly, for nodes en route, the knowledge of the shared
secrets along a middle part of the route does not compromise the anonymity of nodes
en route, especially when the length of this middle part is very short, e.g. two hops.




Figure 4.2: The repair of damaged route
We assume that, nodes can detect route failures when re-transmission count exceeds
a predefined number. For example, as shown in Figure 4.2, Xi detects that the route to
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Xi+1 is not available any more. Upon detection, it looks up the corresponding entry in
its forwarding table, finds the current TAG information that it shares with the previous
node and the secret shared with the next node, and then broadcasts a route error packet
with the following format:
[RERR, TAGj , Tj({Ti+1, T ime}TPK)],
where
TAGj — the TAG that the current node shares with the previous node en route.
Tj — the shared secret that the current node shares with the previous node en
route.
T ime — a time stamp for the RERR packet.
Intermediate nodes receiving such a RERR packet forward it to the previous nodes
after replacing the TAG and re-calculating the last element of the RERR packet. The
process is repeated until the RERR packet reaches the source. After extracting Ti+1
from the packet, S compares it with the record in its local route table, and finds out
the exact node, Xi here, reporting the route error. To discover a new route to the
destination, S sends out a RRPR packet along the previous route. The data portion of
the packet is of the following format:




TAGj+1— the TAG that the current node shares with the next node en route.
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H2() — a collision-resistant cryptographic hash function.
T ime′ — a time stamp for the RRPR packet.
Each node en route simply forwards the packet, if it did not send a RERR message
for the broken route before. When the packet reaches Xi, Xi decrypts the packet and
extracts Ti+2 which becomes a shared secret between Xi and Xi+2. Following that,
Xi launches a route request from itself to Xi+2. It is similar to the previous route
discovery process between S and D but with fewer hops. One major difference is that
the identity of the destination in the RREQ packet is replaced with a broadcasting
address. To verify whether it is the destination of the packet, a receiver needs to first
recover Ks from the third element and then use it to decrypt the fourth element. If
the receiver can recover seq successfully, it is the destination of this RREQ packet. In
other words, compared to the global route discovery process, a receiver of a local repair
RREQ packet has to execute one more decryption. The other major difference is that
in the local repair process, we set a very short time period denoted as T imeLR as the
lifetime of the RREQ packet. The setting of T imeLR is related to the random jitter
before sending out a packet. A receiver simply ignores the local repair RREQ packet, if
it is timeout.
Here, as shown in Figure 4.2, we assume that a new route via X ′i+1 is found. Upon
the completion of the route discovery between Xi and Xi+2, Xi sends out a RUPD
packet with the following format:
[RUPD, TAGj , Tj({T ′i+1, T ′i+2, T ime′′}TPK)],
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where
TAGj — the TAG that the current node shares with the previous node en route.
Tj — the shared secret that the current node shares with the previous node en
route.
T ′i+1 — the shared secret that Xi shares with X
′
i+1.
T ′i+2 — the shared secret that X
′
i+1 shares with Xi+2.
T ime′′ — a time stamp for the RUPD packet.
Finally, once receiving the RUPD packet, S updates the corresponding record in its
route table with T ′i+1 and T
′
i+2. In Figure 4.2, there is one node between Xi and Xi+2
on the new route. For the case that there are no intermediate node or more than two
hops on the repaired portion of new route, it is handled in the same way. However, in
practice, we only consider routes with less than three hops, because the longer the route
is, the higher is the probability that the route breaks within a certain time frame.
4.4 Analysis on Anonymity and Security
Firstly, we need to make clear that the Security term discussed in this section does not
include issues about security of the content of data packets being transmitted. It is
easy to see that security of the content of data packets is orthogonal to anonymity and
security of the route protocol.
4.4.1 Passive Attacks & Active Attacks
Attacks against anonymous and secure routing in ad hoc networks can be classified into
two types:
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• Passive Attacks typically involve unauthorized “listening” to the routing packets
or silently refusing to execute the function requested. The former type of attacks
might be an attempt to gain routing information from which the attacker could
extrapolate data about the positions of each node in relation to the others. Such
an attack is usually impossible to detect, since the attacker does not disrupt the
operation of a routing protocol but only attempts to discover valuable information
by listening to the routed traffic.
• Active Attacks are meant to degrade or prevent message flow between the nodes.
They can cause a degradation or complete halt in communications between nodes.
Normally, such an attack involves actions performed by adversaries, for instance,
the replication, modification, and deletion of exchanged data.
Typically, adversaries may launch both passive and active attacks at the same time,
and the information obtained from the former can be used to enhance the effectiveness
of the latter. For example, adversaries may sniff broadcast data and record specific
signs that are used to identify the route, and then launch Denial of Service (DOS) or
Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) attacks by sending or broadcasting fake data
using recorded signs.
For the anonymity and security analysis in this section, we consider attacks from
both internal nodes (i.e. in the route) and external nodes (i.e. out of the route).
4.4.2 Anonymity Analysis
Here, we want to check whether EASE has achieved anonymity-related goals defined
in Section 4.1, namely identity anonymity, location privacy, and route anonymity. In
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the context of anonymity analysis, we assume that all the nodes including nodes on the
discovered route are potential adversaries and are interested in the privacy information
about the two communication parties and discovered routes.
4.4.2.1 Identity Anonymity
In [22, 24], the identity of the destination is disclosed to all the nodes en route. In
contrast, in [23,70–72] the identities of forwarding nodes are disclosed to the destination.
In EASE, there is no node identity involved except the destination’s identity, namely
dest, in the RREQ packet. Fortunately, dest is encrypted by the shared secret between
the source and the destination, and thus it is known only to the two communication
parties. Therefore, EASE can ensure identity anonymity in ad hoc networks.
4.4.2.2 Location Privacy
The idea of current attacks on location privacy is to overhear the route request and
route reply packets and then deduce the distance from the source or the destination by
checking the length of those packets.
In [23,70–72], the authors add padding only to the original route request and route
reply packets, while in the middle part of the route the route request and route reply
packets are forwarded without being padded. In addition, each forwarding node appends
fixed-length information, including the id of the node and a session key (shared encryp-
tion key generated by the node), etc., to the route request packet. Therefore, every
node receiving the route request packet can deduce the distance between the source and
itself. In [22], authors propose to add random padding to the packets, after calculating
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the onion2 at each step. This method works well, when adversaries are not in the route.
However, in order to calculate and replace the onion in the route request and route reply
packets, internal nodes (nodes en route) need to have full knowledge about the actual
size of the onion received. Consequently, their work is still vulnerable to internal nodes.
In [25], the location of the destination is open to all the nodes in the network.
In EASE, we undertake two different methods to counterattack traffic analysis launched
by both external and internal nodes. On one hand, a random padding is added at each
forwarder’s decision so that external nodes cannot match payload length to get useful
information about the location of the source or the destination. On the other hand,
more importantly, the lengths of the meaningful contents of the route request and the
route reply do not increase along the route so that internal nodes cannot deduce how
far they are from the source or the destination.
4.4.2.3 Route Anonymity
Current attacks on route anonymity are based on Traffic Analysis [106]. The theory
behind all these attacks is to detect common information among sniffed packets, and
assume that any two packets are transferred along the same route, if they have infor-
mation in common. The “common information” could be either identical content (e.g.,
the same sequence number) in sniffed packets, or identical time consumed by handling
sniffed packets, or certain pattern of variations (e.g., the increase of the length of the
packets).
In EASE, hop-by-hop payload shuﬄe is employed to prevent adversaries from match-
2Onion is a cryptographic data structure which was first proposed in [67].
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ing the content of packets. The second case is also referred as Time Analysis. In timing
analysis, temporal dependency between transmissions can be used by advesaries to trace
a victim message’s forwarding path. One usual method to thwart timing analysis is to
use mixing technique [107–109]. More specifically, we can use a buffer to store and
reshuﬄe the sequence of received data packets, and at the same time inject dummy
packets into the buffer if necessary. As to the third case, we ensure that the length of
packets does not change during the transmission, since the increase of the packet length
could be one signal for route tracing.
In [23,70–72], when the route reply is sent back to the source, each forwarding node
removes one encryption layer, i.e. fixed-length information, from the route reply that it
receives. Obviously, such a variation could be one signal for adversaries to tracing the
route. In [25], nodes generate a pseudo ID and a temporary MAC address instead of
using their real identities and MAC addresses. Unfortunately, such IDs and temporary
MAC addresses are unchanged during the data transmission. Therefore, adversaries can
easily identify the whole route by sniffing and comparing pseudo IDs and temporary
MAC addresses in data packets.
Table 4.2 shows the comparison of the anonymity-related properties achieved in
known anonymous routing protocols for ad hoc networks. In the table, SDAR, ANODR,
MASK, and AO2P stand for the anonymous routing protocols proposed in [22–25], re-
spectively. As shown in Table 4.2, EASE and MASK are the only protocols providing
complete strong location privacy. However, MASK in fact is a routing protocol in which
all the nodes involved in the route, i.e. both the source/destination pair and interme-
diate nodes en route, are from the same party, and thus can construct shared secrets
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SDAR ANODR MASK AO2P EASE
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Table 4.2: Comparison of the anonymity property of routing protocols
among themselves before launching the route discovery process. Therefore, to be more
accurate, MASK is not a generic anonymous routing protocol for ad hoc networks.
4.4.3 Security Analysis
4.4.3.1 Passive Attacks
The simplest attack on the route protocol is that adversaries or selfish nodes silently
refuse to perform functions requested in the protocol. In normal routing protocols, the
watchdog model [75] can be employed to detect such actions. However, in anonymous
routing, the route reply is modified hop-by-hop and is supposed to be undistinguishable
from other route replies. Therefore, by nature, we cannot figure out which route a given
sniffed route reply belongs to, since it is a trade-off between anonymity and security.




According to the target of the attack, DoS attacks in the context of anonymous routing
can be classified into two types: Multiple-to-One attacks and One-to-Multiple attacks.
In the former attacks, multiple adversaries (or one adversary with strong power)
may cooperate to exhaust the resource of a given target. The most critical step of such
attacks is to identify the target, either its identity or its exact location. In [22–24], the
identities of either the destination or nodes en route are disclosed, while in [25] the exact
location of the destination is known to all the nodes receiving the route request. Our
protocol is immune to this type of attacks, since both identity anonymity and location
privacy are ensured in EASE.
As to the latter attacks, one adversary can send fake route request packets which
exhaust the computation resources of all consequent nodes along the route, since those
nodes would perform the cryptographic computation as requested in the protocol. In
EASE, such attacks are prevented by (a) little computation, i.e., a XOR operation and
a shift operation, is involved in modifying the RREQ packet before rebroadcasting; (b)
employ the hop-by-hop authentication on the RREP packet. In [23,70–72], the compu-
tation involved in handling the route request consists of two parts: signing the route
request received with the receiver’s private key and encrypting all the information added
by this node with a temporary public key. Compared to [23,70–72], the computational
cost of this process in [22] is much lower. However, it still requires a symmetric key
encryption to calculate the onion.
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4.4.3.3 Attacks on Route Maintenance
One possible attack is that adversaries send fake route error packets to fool the source
to choose another route or even re-launch the route discovery process. It makes no sense
when adversaries en route launch such an attack. Therefore, in the context of attacks
on route maintenance, we only consider adversaries which are not in the route.
In [23,70–72], there is no shared secret between consecutive nodes en route, and thus a
node detecting route failures has difficulties in informing the source such failures. In [25],
although there exist shared secrets, i.e. pseudo ID and temporary MAC address pairs,
between nodes en route, such information is unchanged during the data transmission.
Therefore, adversaries can generate fake route error messages using the information
collected from previously sniffed data packets.
In EASE, no adversary out of the route can construct fake route error packets,
because it does not hold any secret with any node en route, which is necessary to
generate the TAG in the route error packet.
4.4.3.4 Wormhole Attacks
In Wormhole Attacks [12], an attacker records packets received at one location in the
network, tunnels them to another location, and retransmits them into the network. Hu,
Perrig, and Johnson propose an approach to detect wormhole attacks based on packet
leashes [12]. The key intuition is that by authenticating either an extremely precise
timestamp (i.e., temporal leashes) or location information combined with a loose times-
tamp (i.e., geographical leashes), a receiver can determine if the packet has traversed
a distance that is unrealistic for the specific network technology used. Both of the
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SDAR ANODR MASK AO2P EASE
Passive Attacks
√ √ √ √ √
Multiple-to-One DoS Attacks X X X X
√
One-to-Multiple DoS Attacks X X
√ √ √





√ √ √ √ √
Table 4.3: Comparison of the security property of routing protocols
solutions can be easily integrated into EASE without any conflict.
Table 4.3 shows the comparison of the security-related properties achieved in known
anonymous routing protocols for ad hoc networks.
4.5 Simulation Results & Efficiency Analysis
In this section, we analyze the efficiency of EASE and compare it with other generic
anonymous routing protocols [22, 23, 70–72] from two aspects: computation costs and
communication costs.
Here, we do not consider MASK [24] and AO2P [25], due to the following reasons. In
[24], the authors assume that a TA assigns each node in a group with a sufficiently large
set of collision-resistant pseudonyms and a corresponding secret point set. And such
information is used to generate shared session key and link identifier pairs, which are
similar to the TAG in EASE, among nodes in the same group before launching the route
discovery process. Apparently, MASK aims at finding anonymous routes among nodes in
the same party instead of all the nodes in the network, and the low computational cost
of handling route requests is based on costly before-hand computation of generating
shared session key and link identifier pairs. In the AO2P protocol [25], the authors
assume that there exist a small set of trusted nodes which can act as secure position
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Asymmetric Symmetric
Encryption or Encryption or Others
Decryption Decryption
SDAR 2 0 none
ANODR 0 1 none
EASE 0 0 one XOR and one shift
Table 4.4: Cryptographic operations for handling a route request
Asymmetric Symmetric
Encryption or Encryption or Others
Decryption Decryption
SDAR 0 1 none
ANODR 2 2 none
EASE 2 2 none
Table 4.5: Cryptographic operations for handling a route reply
servers, and they only concern about the identity anonymity but ignore the disclosure
of the location and route information. Consequently, in the section, we only compare
EASE with SDAR [23,70–72] and ANODR [22].
4.5.1 Computational Costs
In Table 4.4 and Table 4.5, we show the cryptographic operations that intermediate
nodes carry out to modify a route request or route reply packet before forwarding it.
Standard cryptographic algorithms can be employed for asymmetric and symmetric
encryption/decryptions in both EASE and other anonymous routing protocols. For
example, we can use RSA (1024-bit key) and AES (128-bit key & block) for asymmetric
and symmetric encryption/decryption, respectively. Table 4.6 shows the performance
of different cryptosystems on an iPAQ3670 pocket PC with Intel StrongARM 206MHz
CPU [22]. For asymmetric key cryptosystems, the table shows processing latency per
encryption/decryption operation. For symmetric key cryptosystems (the five AES final
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Cryptosystem decryption encryption
ECAES (160-bit key) 42ms 160ms
RSA (1024-bit key) 900ms 30ms
El Gamal (1024-bit key) 80ms 100ms
AES/Rijndael (128-bit key & block) 29.2Mbps 29.1Mbps
RC6 (128-bit key & block) 53.8Mbps 49.2Mbps
Mars (128-bit key & block) 36.8Mbps 36.8Mbps
Serpent (128-bit key & block) 15.2Mbps 17.2Mbps
TwoFish (128-bit key & block) 30.9Mbps 30.8Mbps
Table 4.6: Processing overhead of various cryptosystems
candidates), the table shows encryption/ decryption bit-rate.
As shown in Table 4.4, in the terms of handling route requests, in EASE forwarding
nodes perform only one XOR operation and one shift operation, instead of carrying out
symmetric or asymmetric encryptions in SDAR [23, 70–72] and ANODR [22]. As to
the computation cost of handling route replies, as shown in Table 4.5, SDAR requires
only one symmetric decryption, while EASE and ANODR have the same amount of
computation, i.e. two symmetric encryption/decryption and two asymmetric encryp-
tion/decryption.
However, in all the generic anonymous routing protocols for ad hoc networks, in-
cluding SDAR, ANODR, and EASE, minimization of the computation costs involved in
handling a route request are more important than reducing the costs of handling a route
reply, because the route request is forwarded to flood the whole network. In contrast,
the route reply is only forwarded reversely along the route found. Simulation results in
Section 4.5.2 show that, the number of route requests received is much larger than the
number of route replies received during the route discovery process. For example, when
the simulation model is “single path without local repair” and the number of nodes
in the network is 50, the number of route requests received is around 9 to 11 times
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as the number of route replies received. According to Table 4.4 and Table 4.5, SDAR
consumes two asymmetric encryption/decryption while handling a RREQ packet, while
EASE and ANODR consumes two asymmetric encryption/decryption while handling
a RREP packet. In addition, in [23, 70–72], the asymmetric cryptographic operations
taken by a forwarding node are executed upon a large amount of data, including the
whole RREQ message received, the identity of this node, a session key and a random
number generated by this node, the length of which increases along the route. Further-
more, the computation cost of a symmetric encryption/decryption is a few orders faster
than that of an asymmetric encryption/decryption.
We also implemented the cryptographic operations performed in EASE and ANODR
for handling route requests. The program was written in Java, and was executed on
a Pentium IV 2.2G desktop. In the implementation for EASE, we set the length of
random number being XORed, i.e. px in Section 4.3.1, to be 16 bits, and the maximum
number of hops, i.e. Hmax, was set to be 10 hops. In the implementation for ANODR,
we used the same setting that authors mention in [22], i.e. set the length of the onion
as 400 bits for a distance of 10 hops. Simulation results show that, EASE is around 10
to 12 times faster than ANODR. Therefore, EASE is the most efficient one among the
three generic anonymous routing protocols, while SDAR is the most costly one.
4.5.2 Communication Costs
The routing protocols and related simulation models are implemented using Java in
Simulation Time / Scalable Wireless Ad hoc Network Simulator (JiST/SWANS ) [110,
111], which is a Java-based simulation engine developed by Cornell University. JiST
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is efficient, out-performing existing highly optimized simulation runtimes both in space
and time.
We ran the simulation in a 3000m X 3000m network, and the node transmission
radius was set to be 625m. The Random Way-point model [13] was applied to emulate
node mobility pattern. According to the model, a node travels to a random chosen
location in a certain speed and stays for a while before going to another random location.
In our simulation, for each test, a pair of the source and the destination is chosen
randomly from nodes in the network. The source begins to send the first data message
10 seconds after the start of the simulation. Afterwards, it sends one data message per
second, until all the 100 data messages have been sent out. The simulation is terminated
after running for 160 seconds. For each setting of the simulations, we ran the simulation
program for 40 times and then calculate the average values.
4.5.2.1 Simulation Models
There are many methods that can improve the performance of traditional routing pro-
tocols. Some of the most frequently-used methods include repairing the broken part of
the route locally, storing multi-paths during the route discovery process, and forwarding
the route requests with a certain probability. For the former two methods, we design
the following communication simulation models for analyzing the communication costs:
SP-NLR only store the first route found, and do not employ any local repair mech-
anism.
MP-NLR store all the routes found during the route discovery process, but do not
employ any local repair mechanism. After the route discovery process, the
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source chooses the shortest path to transmit data. If the path is broken, the
source will choose the shortest one among other routes found to continue the
data transmission.
SP-LR only store the first route found, and employ the local repair mechanism
provided in EASE. If the route is broken, the source will launch the local
repair mechanism. If fails to repair the route locally, it will begin a new route
discovery process.
MP-LR store all the routes found during the route discovery process, and employ
the local repair mechanism provided in EASE as well. After the route dis-
covery, the source chooses the shortest path to transmit data. If the path is
broken, it will first launch the local repair mechanism. If fails to repair the
route locally, the source will the shortest one among other routes found. Such
process is repeatedly, until all the routes found in the previous route discovery
process are broken and unable to be repaired locally. Then, the source has to
begin a new route discovery process.
As to the latter method, i.e. forwarding the route requests with a certain probability,
we will discuss it separately in Section 4.5.2.5
In the original protocols proposed, both SDAR [23, 70–72] and ANODR [22] only
support SP − NLR, but they can be extended to support MP − NLR as well. In
contrast, EASE can support all the four simulation models.
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4.5.2.2 Metrics for Evaluating the Simulation
Metrics we used for evaluating the anonymous routing protocols include: (1) the numbers
of route discovery packets (including RREQ, RREP, RERR, and RRPR, RUPD, if
any) sent and received, which are denoted as RDISs and RDISr, respectively; (2) the
numbers of all the packet (including all the route discovery packets and data transmission
packets, i.e. data packets denoted as DATA and acknowledge packets denoted as ACK)
sent and received, which are denoted as PACKs and PACKr, respectively; (3) the
numbers of route reply packets sent and received, which are denoted as RREPs and
RREPr, respectively. The reason that we pay more attention to route reply packets
is based on the observation that, in both EASE and AONDR, the computational cost
of handling a RREP packet is much larger than that of handling a RREQ packet or a
packet of any other type, due to the costly asymmetric encryption/decryption; (4) the
success rate of transmitting data messages. It is denoted as SucRate.
4.5.2.3 Different Node Densities






























Figure 4.3: # of route discovery packets sent under different node densities
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Figure 4.4: # of route discovery packets received under different node densities





























Figure 4.5: # of all the packets sent under different node densities
In this simulation, we test all the four models, i.e. SP-NLR, MP-NLR, SP-LR, and
MP-LR, under different node densities. Let n denote the number of nodes within the
simulation field or network. Five different node densities, i.e. n = 20, 40, 60, 80, 100,
are simulated to analyze the efficiencies of the four models under low (n ≤ 40), medium
(40 < n < 80), and high (n ≥ 80) density, respectively. In the simulation, mobility
speed is chosen randomly from 0 to 20 m/sec, and the pause time is set to 0 second. The
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Figure 4.6: # of all the packets received under different node densities
simulation results under different node densities are shown in Figure 4.3 to Figure 4.9.
SP-LR vs. SP-NLR As shown in Figure 4.3 to Figure 4.9, SP-LR and SP-NLR are
similar in terms of RDISs, PACKs, and RREPs/RREPr, but SP-LR has smaller RDISr
and PACKr when the node density is high. This advantage results in less computation
overhead involved in handling the route discovery and data transmission packets in the
SP-NLR model when the node density is high. Besides that, we notice that in Figure 4.9
SP-LR has the highest success rate of transmitting DATA messages (i.e. SucRate), and
the SucRate of SP-LR is around 1% to 8% higher than that of SP-NLR.
SP-LR vs. MP-NLR As shown in Figure 4.3 to Figure 4.6, compared to SP-LR,
MP-NLR generates and receives more route discovery and data transmission packets
when the node density is low to medium. However, we notice that MP-NLR is less
sensitive to the increase of node density, and thus it is the simulation model with the
least RDISs/RDISr and PACKs/PACKr when the node density is high. It seems that
MP-NLR is a good choice when the network has a high density. Unfortunately, according
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Figure 4.7: # of RREP packets sent under different node densities




























Figure 4.8: # of RREP packets received under different node densities
to Figure 4.7 and Figure 4.8, the RREPs/RREPr in MP-NLR is around 3 to 7 times
as those in SP-LR when the node density is medium or high. Considering the costly
operations (i.e. asymmetric encryption/decryption) involved in handling RREP packets,
MP-NLR is less efficient than SP-LR. Moreover, the SucRate of MP-NLR is around 6%
to 13% less than that of SP-LR.
SP-LR vs. MP-LR Compared to SP-LR, MP-LR has relative higher RDISs/RDISr
and PACKs/PACKr, especially when the node density is medium. In addition, the
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Figure 4.9: Success rate of transmitting DATA messages under different node densities
RREPs/RREPr of MP-LR are around 3 to 6 times as those of SP-LR, and the SucRate
of MP-LR is around 6% to 14% higher than that of SP-LR.
4.5.2.4 Different Mobility Settings
































Figure 4.10: # of route discovery packets sent under different mobility settings
Similar to the simulation under different node densities, we test all the four models,
i.e. SP-NLR, MP-NLR, SP-LR, and MP-LR, under different mobility settings. Suppose
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Figure 4.11: # of route discovery packets received under different mobility settings

























Figure 4.12: # of all the packets sent under different mobility settings
that, the speed of any node in the network is chosen randomly from 0 to vmax. Five
different mobility settings, i.e. vmax = 4, 8, 12, 16, 20 m/s, are simulated to analyze
the efficiencies of the four models under low (vmax ≤ 8 m/s), medium (8 m/s < vmax <
16 m/s), and high (vmax ≥ 16 m/s) mobility, respectively. In the simulation, the pause
time is set to 0 second. The simulation results under different mobility settings are
shown in Figure 4.10 to Figure 4.16.
SP-LR vs. SP-NLR According to Figure 4.10 to Figure 4.15, SP-NLR generates
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Figure 4.13: # of all the packets received under different mobility settings



























Figure 4.14: # of RREP packets sent under different mobility settings
and receives less route discovery and data transmission packets when the mobility is
low. However, when the node mobility increases, especially when vmax ≥ 16 m/s, SP-
LR is more efficient in the sense that it has less RDISs/RDISr, RREPs/RREPr, and
PACKs/PACKr. Similarly, SP-LR has higher SucRates (i.e. around 2.5% to 5.5% higher
than that of SP-NLR), when the node mobility is medium to high.
SP-LR vs. MP-NLR As shown in Figure 4.10 to Figure 4.13, compared to MP-
NLR, SP-LR is less sensitive to the increase of mobility. More specifically, MP-NLR
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Figure 4.15: # of RREP packets received under different mobility settings
generates and receives similar or slightly higher numbers of route discovery and data
transmission packets when the mobility is low to medium, but it tends to be inefficient
when the mobility is medium to high. As to the RREPs/RREPr, in Figure 4.14 and
Figure 4.15, we find that SP-LR is much more efficient when the mobility is medium
or high. More specifically, MP-NLR generates and receives around 4 to 7 times RREP
packets as SP-LR does. Besides that, the SucRate of SP-LR is around 4% to 13% higher
than that of MP-NLR, when the mobility is medium or high.
SP-LR vs. MP-LR As shown in Figure 4.10 to Figure 4.15, SP-LR is more efficient
than MP-LR, and such an advantage is more obvious when the node mobility increases.
For example, when the mobility is medium to high, i.e. v ≥ 8 m/s, MP-LR generates
and receives around 4 to 6 times RREP packets as SP-LR does. Besides that, the
SucRate of SP-LR is around 6% to 14% higher than that of MP-LR, when the mobility
is medium or high.
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Figure 4.16: Success rate of transmitting DATA messages under different mobility set-
tings
4.5.2.5 Forwarding Route Requests with A Certain Probability
In this simulation, we try to simulate the effectiveness of the method that forwards
route requests with a certain probability denoted as p in improving the efficiency of
anonymous routing protocols. We simulate the SP-LR model with six forwarding prob-
abilities ranging from 50% to 100%. The empirical results are shown in Table 4.7. This
table shows that, when the forwarding probability is 90%, we get the best SucRate,
i.e. 90.90%. Besides that, compared to the case that nodes always forward the route
requests received, i.e. p = 100%, the network generates around 10% less RREP packets
and around 5% to 9% less RDIS and PACK packets, when p = 90%. However, when
we try to decrease the forwarding probability further, as shown in Table 4.7, either the
network generates more RREP, RDIS, and PACk packets, e.g. p = 80%, or the SucRate
drops around 5% to 9%, e.g. p = 50%, 60%, 70%.
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RREPs/RREPr RDISs/RDISr PACKs/PACKr SucRate
50% 38.15/302.4 484.2/3703.7 951.6/10371.6 81.30%
60% 34.15/288.15 391.3/3026.35 873.45/9871 85.55%
70% 37.45/305.6 463.95/3580.1 930.7/10094.3 81.85%
80% 38.55/333.3 457.05/3492.2 943.6/10626.95 89.05%
90% 35.6/280.2 442.45/3350.85 901.9/9455.8 90.90%
100% 38.4/312.75 463.55/3462.85 947.75/10347.7 89.90%
Table 4.7: Forwarding route requests with different probabilities
4.5.2.6 Communication Overhead over AODV
EASE has higher communication overhead compared to AODV, which does not have
full anonymity and security supports. It is mainly due to the usage of one time public
key, i.e. PKi, and One-time Key Pad like random secrets (denoted as OKP secrets),
i.e. Uorig, Ui, Vorig, Vi, although several fields in AODV, e.g. the IP address of next
path node [74], are unnecessary in EASE and thus removed. The overhead is related
to a few factors, including Hmax, px/qx, and qd. Note that, the purposes of employing
the OKP secrets in route request and route response are different. In the former, it is
to let the destination deduce the length of the route found, and thus px can be set to a
small number, e.g. 16, so long as the probability that the destination makes an incorrect
judgement due to the collisions is very tiny. Instead, in route response, the shared
secrets between consecutive nodes en route are used in anonymous data transmission
at a later time, and thus qx needs to be set to a larger number, e.g. 128. Given that
Hmax is set to 10 and qd is chosen according to Equation (4.6), the overheads of EASE




According the empirical results and analysis from Section 4.5.2.3 to Section 4.5.2.5,
overall, SP-LR is the best choice, when taking all the metrics into consideration. It works
well when the network becomes denser. Furthermore, compared to other models, SP-
LR is more efficient when the mobility increases. Consequently, as the only anonymous
routing protocol supporting the local repair mechanism, compared to SDAR [23,70–72]





In this chapter, we summarize our work in two major areas of securing ad hoc networks,
i.e. key management and anonymous secure routing. The contributions achieved in
these two areas are listed. Furthermore, we point out possible future work related to or
based on our work presented in this dissertation.
5.1 Contributions of Our Work
The main contributions of our work can be divided into three parts:
5.1.1 Key Management Model for Large Ad Hoc networks
Handle KeyManagement Problem in Large Ad Hoc Networks Cur-
rent research work [1–3,19,20] can handle only limited number of nodes. When
the number of nodes increases, all of them become either inefficient or insecure.
In this dissertation, we have proposed the AKM scheme which can handle ad
hoc networks with a large number of nodes.
Self-organizing Regions In a dynamic environment, such as ad hoc net-
works, regions at different places or even the same region at different times
may face different intensities of risks. In AKM, not only the structure of key
management may change with the increase/decrease in the number of nodes,
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but also different parts of the structure have the freedom to set appropriate
configurations to cope with various levels of risks.
Risk Isolation Unlike in the flat structure, the hierarchical structure helps
isolate risks from different regions. In addition, as shown in Section 3.4.1, GSK
is well protected in AKM.
RTC – Security Index We proposed a new concept RTC, and the simu-
lation results in Section 3.4.2 show that it is suitable to use RTC as the index
of security situation of a region, if the two global rules are followed.
Small Computation Costs Involved Simulation results show that com-
putation costs due to the variations, including node-based and region-based
operations, are very small under common threshold and region size settings.
5.1.2 certification services against Active Attacks
Robust against Active Attacks Existing research work [1–3,19,20] can
only resist passive attacks, such as dropping the certificate request, and are
vulnerable under active attacks, such as the returning of a fake reply to the
node requesting certification services. We propose two algorithms, both of
which can defend active attacks on certification services.
Efficient Simulation results in Section 3.4.5 show that, even if adversaries
do not launch active attacks, our second algorithm is still faster than [1–3].
For example, when the key length is 1024 bits, our second algorithm is around
six to eight times faster.
Easy to Find Enough Neighbors That Provide certification services
145
The process of generating partial certificates in our second algorithm is ex-
tremely fast. For example, when the key length is 1024 bits, our algorithm is
around 20 to 80 times faster. Such advantage is critical in ad hoc networks
where intrinsically the less help a node requests from its neighbors, the higher
chance it gets the help. Consequently, using our second algorithm, a node can
easily find enough neighbor nodes which provide the certification service.
5.1.3 Anonymous Secure Routing
Re-define Anonymity and Security Requirements on Ad Hoc Net-
work Routing Protocols In view of the fact that, in previous work
[22–25, 70–72], the definition of anonymity is incomplete. We re-define the
anonymity and security properties that are supposed to be achieved in anony-
mous secure routing protocols.
Provide “Identity Anonymity” Compared to previous work [22–24,70–
72], ASR provides a new anonymity property, “Identity Anonymity”. Namely,
no one involved in the routing protocol knows the identities of any other node
en route, except that the source and destination know the identity of each
other.
Provide “Strong Location Privacy” Another additional anonymity
property achieved by ASR is “Strong Location Privacy”. It means that no
one knows the exact or even relative (i.e. the number of hops, from either the
source or the destination) location of the source or the destination.
Anonymity and Security Analysis on ASR and Other Protocols We
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also give a detailed analysis on the anonymity and security properties achieved
in ASR and the previous work [22–25,70–72].
Provide A Local Repair Mechanism without Compromising Security
and Anonymity We proposed a local repair mechanism so that, instead
of re-launching the costly flooding-based route discovery process, EASE can
repair the broken part locally without compromising security and anonymity
properties defined.
Simulate and Analyze Methods That Might be Able to Enhance
Efficiency We simulated various types of methods that might be able to
enhance the efficiency of anonymous routing protocols, e.g. storing multi-
ple paths during the route discovery process and supporting the local repair
mechanism, under different network and mobility models. The analysis on
the simulation results shows that EASE is more efficient compared to previ-
ous solutions in highly dynamic environments like ad hoc networks.
5.2 Future Work
5.2.1 Key Management
As to the key management issue in ad hoc networks, in this dissertation, we managed
to extend threshold schemes from the flat structure to the hierarchical structure. Such
a change brings many advantages over those schemes based on the flat structure. At
the same time, it also opens up a few new issues.
In AKM, RTC is proposed as a rough index of security situation of a region. As
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shown in Section 3.4.2, it is not very accurate, since we notice that the security condition
of a region may vary, even if its RTC remains unchanged. In addition, it is feasible within
certain range – for a region with size less than 250 and RTC less than 0.1 or with size
less than 120 and RTC less than 0.15. Therefore, it is still an open question to find
a parameter that is capable of representing the security condition of a region more
accurately and can be widely applied to different environments.
Currently, research work on different aspects of ad hoc network security, such as key
management and security routing, were conducted separately. As a result of it, some
solutions which are suitable for one aspect are not compatible with requirements of
another aspect. Therefore, it is really desirable and challenging to build a more general
structure which can be the uniform basis on which we can design schemes satisfying
the requirements of different components. Consequently, one possible research direction
is to incorporate the semi-dynamic hierarchical structure proposed in AKM into other
areas of ad hoc network security or even other research fields of ad hoc network, such
as network structure.
Another possible research direction is the security of group-based actions. All current
research work is limited to the issue of a single node. In reality, it is common that nodes
may join or leave as a group. Although group-based actions can be handled as a series
of actions of single node, it takes more time to complete the authentication process. In
addition, sometimes it is desirable to keep the relationship between group members even
when they join a new environment. In AKM, the network is region-based. If treat each
region as a group and nodes in the region as members of the group, we can make use of
the key management and certification services provided by AKM to achieve the security
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of group-based actions.
5.2.2 Privacy in Sensor Networks
Compared to ad hoc networks, on one hand, sensor networks allow the existence of
certain more powerful nodes to collect and analyze information from normal sensors.
Therefore, it is possible to setup the Trust Authority (TA) in the network. It seemingly
makes the job of securing sensor networks more easier. On the other hand, however,
due to the extremely limited computation and storage capability of normal sensors, the
usage of Public Key Cryptography (PKC) is highly restricted. As such, EASE cannot be
used directly in sensor networks, because the cost of hop-by-hop public key encryptions
and verifications during the route discovery process is unaffordable. It would be a great
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